From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types
By Andrei Serjantov, Roger Dingledine, Paul F. Syverson. 2002
254 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- George Danezis
- Henry Corrigan-Gibbs
- Dan Boneh
- Ari Juels
- Nick Mathewson
- Martin Vuagnoux
- Sylvain Pasini
- Arvind Narayanan
In Computer Networks and Communications
- George Danezis
- Martin Vuagnoux
- Sylvain Pasini
- Henry Corrigan-Gibbs
- Nick Mathewson
- Dan Boneh
- Joseph Bonneau
- Roger Dingledine
Citations in the corpus
- Prio: Private, Robust, and Scalable Computation of Aggregate Statistics (2017, background): “In this attack, the network adversary prevents all honest clients except one from being able to contact the Prio servers [105].”
- Riposte: An Anonymous Messaging System Handling Millions of Users (2015, background): “The definition of what constitutes an epoch is crucial for security, since a client’s anonymity set is only as large as the number of honest clients who submit write requests in the same epoch [74].”
- The pynchon gate: a secure method of pseudonymous mail retrieval (2005, background): “Message buckets are of a fixed size, to protect against active flooding attacks [ 51 ] as well as simple usage pattern analysis.”
- Compromising Electromagnetic Emanations of Wired and Wireless Keyboards (2009, methodology): “Timing analysis has also been applied to attack cryptosystems [5, 34, 17, 8].”
- Mixcoin: Anonymity for Bitcoin with Accountable Mixes (2014, background): “Mixing literature also considers extended attacker capabilities, such as compromising mixes, delaying or blocking messages, replaying old messages, or flooding the network with dummy messages [28].”
- Universal Re-encryption for Mixnets (2004, background): “See [23] for a further discussion of pool mixes,”
- AMOEBA: Robust Location Privacy Scheme for VANET (2007, methodology): “This attack is similar to the blending attack proposed in [33], where for tracing inputs through a MIX the adversary selectively controls the inputs entering the MIX.”
- Timing Attacks in Low-Latency Mix Systems (Extended Abstract) (2004, unknown): “, [4, 12, 18, 15, 13]), but mainly for high-latency systems, e.”
- Mixminion: design of a type III anonymous remailer protocol (2003, methodology): “Cascades can provide greater anonymity against an adversary who owns many mixes [6], but they are also more vulnerable to blending attacks such as trickle or flooding attacks [36].”