Voluntary Disclosure and Equity Offerings: Reducing Information Asymmetry or Hyping the Stock?*
By Mark H. Lang, Russell J. Lundholm. 2000
963 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/73363acbcc9c31ceaf9ff463ee7a8adccb02b202
How researchers see this paper
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In Accounting
- Christian Leuz
- Martin Walker
- Peter D. Wysocki
- K. Hussainey
- Inder K. Khurana
- Mary E. Barth
- G. Iatridis
- Jeong‐Bon Kim
In Finance
- Martin Walker
- Christian Leuz
- Peter D. Wysocki
- Mary E. Barth
- L. Shivakumar
- Inder K. Khurana
- Claire Marston
- Daniel A. Cohen
Citations in the corpus
- Accounting disclosure and firms' financial attributes: Evidence from the UK stock market (2008, background): “In such cases, voluntary disclosures would be misleading and would lead to incorrect decision-making (see Lang & Lundholm, 1996, 2000).”
- Disclose or not disclose: determinants of social reporting for STOXX Europe 600 firms (2010, background): “This could especially be the case if investors have noticed bad trends effecting the company, who in turn will wish to give a more detailed account of the situation in question ( Lang and Lundholm 2000 ).”
- The spillover effects of MD&A disclosures for real investment: The role of industry competition (2019, background): “, 2008; Kuhnen, 2015), and positive language is less credible than negative language, since managers may benefit from positive language more than from negative language (Lang and Lundholm, 2000; Hutton et al., 2003).”
- An Organizational Approach to Comparative Corporate Governance: Costs, Contingencies, and Complementarities (2008, neutral): “A number of studies have found that corporate governance may have a high cost impact on the firm’s proprietary information through requirements of information disclosure (Lang and Lundholm 2000; Healy and Palepu 2001).”
- Managerial Incentives and Management Forecast Precision (2013, methodology): “Motivated by the usefulness of management forecasts, prior research has examined extensively what determines their frequency (e.g., Skinner 1994, 1997; Lang and Lundholm 2000; Cheng and Lo 2006).”
- Are Investors Influenced By How Earnings Press Releases Are Written? (2008, neutral): “This tone measure contrasts with previous accounting studies that examined “tone” as a judgmentally assessed variable (Francis et al., 1994; Lang & Lundholm, 2000).”
- A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature: Discussion (2001, neutral): “…In this case, the effect of disclosure is likely to be a subtle, secondorder, effect for most U.S. firms, and this effect would only be detected in samples where there are large changes in disclosure policy such as in Healy et al. (1999), Lang and Lundholm (2000), and Leuz and Verrecchia (2001).”
- The Effects of Information Disclosure and Board Independence on IPO Discount** (2008, methodology): “…on IPOs uses a number of proxies for information disclosure that include a detailed account of plans for the use of the IPO proceeds (Leone, Rock, and Willenborg 2003), risk factors the IPO firm faces (Daily et al. 2003), and the ranking systems of financial analysts (Lang and Lundholm 1996).”
- Audited Financial Reporting and Voluntary Disclosure as Complements: A Test of the Confirmation Hypothesis (2012, positive): “Following Imhoff (1978), Waymire (1985), Cox (1985) and Lang and Lundholm (2000), we control for: earnings volatility (more volatile firms are less likely to issue forecasts which, if issued, are less informative, implying lower SPECIFICITY and HORIZON); stock return volatility; analyst following…”
- Earnings conference calls and stock returns: The incremental informativeness of textual tone (2012, neutral): “(Lang and Lundholm, 2000).”
- The Role of Information Precision in Determining the Cost of Equity Capital (2004, background): “While the theoretical literature has not reached a consensus regarding the diversifiability, or lack thereof, of estimation risk, empirical research generally documents a negative association between public disclosure and the cost of equity capital (Frankel et al., 1995; Welker, 1995; Botosan, 1997;”