Just Who Are You Calling Risk Averse?

By R. Isaac, D. James. 2000

242 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6f1381bfcdab9ddd85f9aa978f81218a3a2c4381

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Citations in the corpus

Stability of risk preference measures: results from a field experiment on French farmers (2012, background): “Isaac and James (2000) compare individual risk attitudes elicited through a first-price auction and the Becker, Degroot, and Marschack (BDM) pricing procedure.”
Risk as feelings. (2001, unknown): “When viewed through the lens of consequentialist models such as the expected utility model, people's risk-taking behavior often appears to be highly variable and inconsistent across domains and situations (Isaac & James, 2000; MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986 Schoemaker, 1990).”
Are risk preferences stable? Comparing an experimental measure with a validated survey-based measure (2008, result): “This finding is consistent with evidence of risk preference instability reported in prior studies (e.g., Berg et al. 2005; Isaac and James 2000; Kruse and Thompson 2003).”
Regret in auctions: theory and evidence (2007, methodology): “We find that regret theory organizes the Isaac and James (2000) data well, by explaining why participants who act as if they were highly risk averse in SBFP auctions act as if they were risk seeking when confronted with the BDM procedure, while other participants act as if they were risk neutral in…”
A Theoretical and Experimental Appraisal of Five Risk Elicitation Methods (2013, unknown): “Isaac and James (2000) replicate this comparison, adopting a within-subject approach and obtaining similar results.”
Eliciting risk preferences: When is simple better? (2010, background): “3 The existence of a well-behaved utility function (with precise decision making skills on the part of subjects) has been criticized, for example, by researchers that have found that subjects’ preferences are inconsistent across similar tasks (e.g., Slovic 1962; Isaac and James 2000; Berg et al. 200”
Measuring the time stability of Prospect Theory preferences (2010, unknown): “c,d Grable and Lytton (2001) Isaac and James (2000) Hershey and Schoemaker (1985)”
Risk Attitudes of Children and Adults: Choices Over Small and Large Probability Gains and Losses (2002, background): “However, a large number of studies have shown that expected utility theory (EUT) fails to predict the behavior of young adults.1 Or as stated by Starmer (2000), “…put bluntly, the standard theory did not fit the facts.””