Regret in auctions: theory and evidence

By Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Elena Katok. 2007

153 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/529ec8dbe51ad3a4c09afd4265b131aa2c4d5d3c

Citations in the corpus

• Facing Your Opponents (2014, unknown): “The basic concept of regret, analyzed by Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2007, 2008) in the first price auction, is that the winner of the auction may regret paying too much relative to the second highest bid (winner regret) and the loser may regret missing a profitable trade opportunity by bidding…”
• Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments (2013, unknown): “Other potential candidates, for example, are regret (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok, 2007; Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay, 2007) and overconfidence (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999; Park and Santos-Pinto, 2010).”