Life after Kant: Natural purposes and the autopoietic foundations of biological individuality

By Andreas Weber, F. Varela. 2002

550 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Astronomy and Astrophysics, Cognitive Neuroscience, Philosophy

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6d9e613e4cf1ebeaceb0ea209eabb2af9ec85a33

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Citations in the corpus

Defining Agency: Individuality, Normativity, Asymmetry, and Spatio-temporality in Action (2009, background): “…to posit this problem and the framework under which it should be addressed have been made before (Christensen, 1999; Christensen & Bickhard, 2002; Christensen & Hooker, 2000; Di Paolo, 2005; Di Paolo, Rohde, & De Jaegher, in press; Mossio, Saborido, & Moreno, in press; Weber & Varela, 2002).”
Autopoiesis, Adaptivity, Teleology, Agency (2005, background): “If sense-making requires the acquisition of " a valence which is dual at its basis: attraction or rejection, approach or escape " (Weber & Varela, 2002, p. 117), a sense-making system requires, apart from the norm given by self-construction, access to how it currently stands against the…”
Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content (2012, methodology): “…BLOCKIN BLOCKIN on BLOCKIN BLOCKIN autopoiesis BLOCKIN BLOCKIN as BLOCKIN BLOCKIN the BLOCKIN BLOCKIN source BLOCKIN BLOCKIN of BLOCKIN BLOCKIN an BLOCKIN BLOCKIN organism's BLOCKIN BLOCKIN mortality BLOCKIN BLOCKIN and BLOCKIN BLOCKIN its BLOCKIN BLOCKIN concerned doings (Weber and Varela, 2002).”
Horizons for the Enactive Mind: Values, Social Interaction, and Play (2010, background): “Weber and Varela (2002) were the fi rst to suggest a derivation of intrinsic teleology, natural purposes, and the capacity of sense-making from autopoiesis, drawing on Kant ’ s Critique of Judgment and Hans Jonas ’ s philosophy of biology ( Jonas 1966 ), and the position argued for here commits to…”
Enactive artificial intelligence: Investigating the systemic organization of life and mind (2009, methodology): “More importantly, this reciprocal causality entails that a natural purpose then, as an interrelated totality of means and goals, is strictly intrinsic to the organism [136].”
Taking Emergence Seriously: The Centrality of Circular Causality for Dynamic Systems Approaches to Development (2011, background): “In other words, without organisms and the autonomous organization they embody, the world has no meaning [Weber & Varela, 2002].”
Affective Value in the Predictive Mind (2017, background): “The boundedness in the homeostatic set, the ‘mother-value of all values’ (Weber and Varela 2002) also gives the whole predictive endeavor its normativity.”
Participatory sense-making (2007, background): “The idea that metabolism creates a perspective of value on the world has been defended by Hans Jonas (1966) and recently elaborated scientifically in terms of the theory of autopoiesis (Di Paolo 2005; Thompson 2007; Varela 1991; 1997; Weber and Varela 2002).”
Enactivist Interventions: Rethinking the Mind (2017, background): “and Noë, 2001); autopoietic (or classical) enactivism, which grounds cognition in autonomous organization of biological entities (Varela, 1979, 1997; Weber and Varela, 2002); participatory sense-making enactivism, which understands cognition as relying on interactions between autonomous agents (De J”
Emotion and ethics: An inter-(en)active approach (2009, background): “What is meant by ‘sense-making’ in the enactive approach? The term appears in later discussions of the theory of autopoiesis (Weber and Varela 2002), and has recently been refined and clarified (Di Paolo 2005; Thompson 2007; Thompson and Stapleton 2009).”
Sociality and the life–mind continuity thesis (2009, background): “Jonas claims that " inwardness is coextensive with life " (Jonas 1966, p. 58), a position which has been influential in the development of the notion of sensemaking (cf. Weber and Varela 2002; Di Paolo 2005; Thompson 2007).”
Autonomy and Enactivism: Towards a Theory of Sensorimotor Autonomous Agency (2017, background): “Hutto and Myin, has to do with the phenomenological approach that is often combined with autonomy, embodiment and sensorimotor coupling (Thompson 2007; Varela et al. 1991; Weber and Varela 2002).”
Embodiment and sense-making in autism (2013, background): “Sense-making is a relational and affect-laden process grounded in biological organization (Jonas, 1966; Varela, 1991, 1997; Weber and Varela, 2002; Di Paolo, 2005; Thompson, 2007).”
The sense of agency – a phenomenological consequence of enacting sensorimotor schemes (2017, background): “1 For further discussion on the enactive notion of autonomy and its relation to sense-making and agency see e.g. Weber and Varela 2002; Di Paolo 2005; Thompson 2007; Di Paolo and Thompson 2014; also Thompson 2011, and critical commentary in the same issue).”
Musical creativity and the embodied mind (2018, background): “It should also be noted that while this perspective asserts the inseparability of organism and environment, it also seeks to provide a biological account of the autonomy we experience with ourselves and other living beings (Di Paolo, 2005; Schiavio & van der Schyff, 2018; Weber & Varela, 2002).”
Life and mind: From autopoiesis to neurophenomenology. A tribute to Francisco Varela (2004, background): “Theories about the living can only be conceived from the fragile and concerned perspective of the living itself: [and then, quoting Jonas] “. . . life can only be known by life” (Weber and Varela 2002 p. 110).”