Managerial Incentives and Corporate Fraud: The Sources of Incentives Matter

By Derek W. Johnson. 2009

401 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Marketing, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6b62ac2ca374d498e290a6db6f7230ce55b340f7

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Citations in the corpus

Equity Incentives and Corporate Fraud in China (2015, positive): “Johnson et al. (2009) add to this evidence by showing that firms committing fraud tend to offer greater stock incentives.”
SEC Enforcement: Does Forthright Disclosure and Cooperation Really Matter? (2012, background): “The research to-date has generally focused on two themes: the ex ante determinants of fraud and the ex post consequences of fraud (see, e.g., Dechow et al. 1996; Beneish 1999; Erickson et al. 2006; Karpoff et al. 2008a,b,c; Dechow et al. 2011; Armstrong et al. 2010; Johnson et al. 2009).”
Insider Trading Before Accounting Scandals (2015, background): “Echoing Beneish'sfindings, Johnson et al. (2009)find that top executives at earnings-manipulatingfirms sell more stock and exercise more options during the fraud period than executives at control firms.”
Corporate Fraud and Business Conditions: Evidence from IPOs (2010, background): “A number of papers link fraud to equity compensation for executives (e.g., Burns and Kedia 2006, Goldman and Slezak 2006, Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson 2007, Peng and Röell 2008, Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker 2009, and 4 Johnson, Ryan, and Tian 2009).”
Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities (2010, methodology): “For example, Johnson, Ryan, and Tian (2009) and Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2006) both assess the relationship between the incidence of accounting fraud (identified using AAERs) and the equity portfolio delta computed for top firm executives.4 Although the two samples exhibit considerable…”
Evidence on Contagion in Earnings Management (2015, background): “…Wu 2003); (iii) the firm’s stock returns are high and firms might face pressure to manage earnings to sustain overvaluation of their firms (Cheng and Warfield 2005; Johnson, Ryan and Tian 2009), and (iv) firm profitability, as captured by ROA, and earnings volatility is high (Johnson et al. 2009).”
Why 'Good' Firms Do Bad Things: The Effects of High Aspirations, High Expectations and Prominence on the Incidence of Corporate Illegality (2010, neutral): “Other scholars have recently begun to consider why “good” firms may engage in illegal actions (Johnson et al., 2009) or why firms might engage in illegal actions during “good times” (Povel et al.”
Stock-Based Compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives (2008, background): “Expressions (24), (25), and (26) contain the expected utilities at τ∗ under conceal and reveal strategies in the two possible equilibria.”
Dynamic CEO Compensation (2012, background): “−1 " ( ) 1− (1  ) 1−  # = −1 " () 1− (1  ) 1−  #  (43) Condition (42) guarantees that the random variable ln  (1 −1 e ) is weakly more dispersed than ln  (1 −1 e )  It also follows from the EF that both ln  (1 −1 ·) and ln  (1 ”