Estimating the Labor Market Signaling Value of the GED

By John H. Tyler, Richard J. Murnane, J. Willett. 2000

269 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6a21a77106a95a81e9bd9667085abfa64bdc717d

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Demography

1. P. Martorell
2. Damon Clark

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Rebecca Diamond
2. Petra Persson
3. P. Martorell
4. Damon Clark
5. Esteban Rossi-Hansberg
6. Stephen J. Redding
7. Jessie Handbury
8. Cecile Gaubert

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Rebecca Diamond
2. P. Martorell
3. Damon Clark
4. Esteban Rossi-Hansberg
5. Stephen J. Redding
6. Jessie Handbury
7. Cecile Gaubert
8. Victor Couture

Citations in the corpus

• The Long-Term Consequences of Teacher Discretion in Grading of High-Stakes Tests (2016, background): “This insight is related to the sheepskin literature, which analyzes the signaling value of education in the labor market (Cameron and Heckman, 1993; Kane and Rouse, 1995; Kane et al., 1999; Tyler et al., 2000; Clark and Martorell, 2014).”
• The Signaling Value of a High School Diploma (2014, methodology): “Tyler (2004) uses various strategies to compare the earnings of workers that passed and failed a GED in the same state and finds effects of around 10%.”
• The German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) - Scope, Evolution and Enhancements (2007, unknown): “See, e.g., Tyler et al. (2000), Lofstrom/Tyler (2004), and McCrae/Costa 1992.”
• A Signaling Perspective on Employment-Based Reentry Programming Training Completion as a Desistance Signal (2012, unknown): “Tyler et al. (2000) provided supporting evidence for this last proposition by finding situations where two people with the same test score do not get the same certificate.”