Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and “Weak Link” Coordination Games

127 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

The Hot Versus Cold Effect in a Simple Bargaining Experiment (2003, background): “In a weak-link coordination game, Camerer et al. (1996) observed that the ordering of the cold decisions significantly affected the equilibrium selection.”
Neighborhood Information Exchange and Voter Participation: An Experimental Study (2006, background): “First, there may be a ‘timing effect’ where first movers behave differently than second movers, even when no information is exchanged (see, e.g., Rapoport, 1997; Weber et al., 2004).”
Reciprocity, matching and conditional Cooperation in two public goods games (2005, background): “Experimentally, the WLM promotes efficiency in sequential environments (as in Weber et al., 2003), but the results are far less solid in simultaneous settings (Van Huyck et al., 1991).”
Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non-Deterrent (2006, unknown): “Whether it is behaviorally equivalent is an open issue (e.g. Brandts and Charness 2000, Weber et al. 2004), and seems to depend on context.”