Credible Carbon Policy

By Dieter Helm, Cameron Hepburn, Richard Mash. 2003

218 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Environmental Engineering, Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/676a4fee67b8575a1e78c92aabf071409188d564

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Cameron Hepburn
2. Ottmar Edenhofer
3. Richard G. Newell
4. Michael Grubb
5. C. Flachsland
6. Karsten Neuhoff
7. Steffen Brunner
8. Robert Marschinski

In Environmental Engineering

1. Ottmar Edenhofer
2. Michael Grubb
3. C. Mitchell
4. Stefan Pfenninger
5. James Keirstead
6. Robert Marschinski
7. Richard G. Newell
8. Cameron Hepburn

In Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment

1. Ottmar Edenhofer
2. Cameron Hepburn
3. C. Flachsland
4. Robert Marschinski
5. Michael Grubb
6. Karsten Neuhoff
7. Steffen Brunner
8. Richard G. Newell

Citations in the corpus

• Auctioning of EU ETS phase II allowances: how and why? (2006, background): “54 Additional policies would not erode the credibility of the contract, which is so crucial in climate policy (Helm et al., 2003),”
• Environmental policy, government, and the market (2010, background): “While rich countries have significant credibility problems (Helm et al., 2003), the climate policy credibility problems in poorer countries are arguably even more acute.”
• Addressing Climate Change with a Comprehensive U.S. Cap-and-Trade System (2008, unknown): “4 For discussion of the temporal dimension of climate policy, see Helm et al. (2005).”
• To link or not to link: benefits and disadvantages of linking cap-and-trade systems (2009, background): “Hence, firms do not invest the optimal amount in the first place (Helm et al., 2005; Montgomery and Smith, 2007).”
• Allocation and competitiveness in the EU emissions trading scheme: policy overview (2006, background): “…pressures, governments may need to learn from monetary policy, in which the need for credibility of commitments to tackle inflation led to the establishment of independent central banks with clear mandates, and ultimately the creation of the European Central Bank (see Helm et al., 2003).”
• Credible commitment in carbon policy (2012, background): “( 2003 ) highlight time inconsistency as a source of the problem and propose that responsibility be delegated to an independent carbon agency.”
• Historical institutionalism and the politics of sustainable energy transitions: A research agenda (2017, background): “8 A common approach to trying to establish credible commitment in these contexts is then, as with independent regulators, to delegate decision-making to technical, politically-insulated bodies (e.g. Helm et al 2003).”
• Carbon Trading: A Review of the Kyoto Mechanisms (2007, background): “What is needed is a policy structure that has predictability and credibility, which might be designed by building a respected institution by analogy to the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England (51) or by using legal means to contractually bind the government to its promise (52).”
• The role of markets and policies in delivering innovation for climate change mitigation (2010, background): “For market-based GHG emissions policy to provide an effective inducement to innovation, it is critical that the policy be credible to the private sector over the long term (Helm et al., 2003).”
• Energy systems modeling for twenty-first century energy challenges (2014, background): “More formal attempts at classifying energy systems models by various criteria can be found for example in Jebaraj and Iniyan (2006) and Connolly et al.”