New findings on unconscious versus conscious thought in decision making: additional empirical data and meta-analysis.

By Felix Acker. Judgment and Decision Making, 2008

153 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Ninety-eight Australian students participated in a functional replication of a study published by Dijksterhuis et al. (2006). The results indicated that unconscious thought does not necessarily lead to better normative decision making performance than conscious thought, which is contrary to the results found in Dijksterhuis et al. Since other studies showed a positive, though statistically not significant, effect for unconscious thought, a meta-analysis comprising a total of 17 experiments was conducted. It suggests that there is little evidence for an advantage to normative decision making using unconscious thought. However, a discussion of potential moderators shows that further study would help to identify situations in which unconscious thought is truly helpful and those in which it is not.

Subfields: Applied Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience, General Decision Sciences

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6737fd82e65872ea9e192de6d143b18db4a2c304

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Applied Psychology

In Cognitive Neuroscience

In General Decision Sciences

Citations in the corpus

Intuition in Judgment and Decision Making: Extensive Thinking Without Effort (2010, background): “Those who point to the powers of the unconscious in decision making (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006) enter a field of harsh debate (e.g., Acker, 2008; GonzalezVallejo, Lassiter, Belleza, & Lindberg, 2008).”
Intuition: A Challenge for Psychological Research on Decision Making (2010, background): “The findings and boundary conditions of Dijksterhuis’s paradigm have, however, been questioned by other researchers (Acker, 2008; Payne, Samper, Bettman, & Luce, 2008; Newell, Wong, Cheung, & Rakow, 2009).”
Beyond dual-process models: A categorisation of processes underlying intuitive judgement and decision making (2010, background): “Third, results of superior decisions after ‘‘unconscious thinking’’ are found not to be replicable (Acker, 2008; Thorsteinson & Withrow, 2009), while distracted thinking is more susceptible to random ordering effects (Newell, Wong, Cheung, & Rakow, 2009).”
A Meta-Analysis on Unconscious Thought Effects (2011, background): “, Acker, 2008; Calvillo & Penaloza, 2009; Lassiter et al., 2009; Newell et al., 2009; Payne et al., 2008; Rey, Goldstein, & Perruchet, 2009; Thorsteinson & Withrow, 2009; Waroquier, Marchiori, Klein, & Cleeremans, 2009, 2010; see also Newell & Rakow, this issue). Another recurring point of debate is”
How distinct are intuition and deliberation? An eye-tracking analysis of instruction-induced decision modes (2009, background): “There is also a controversial debate if and under which circumstances intuition or deliberation lead to " good " decisions (Acker, 2008; Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006).”