Chicken & Egg: Competition Among Intermediation Service Providers

By Bernard Caillaud, Bruno Jullien. 2003

1,925 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Media Technology, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/660f5d72b58de1e88fbd415c905a13e3b629c435

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Management Science and Operations Research

In Media Technology

In Strategy and Management

Citations in the corpus

Network neutrality on the Internet: A two-sided market analysis (2012, neutral): “Hence, our paper is related to the literature on two-sided markets (e.g. Armstrong, 2006; Caillaud and Jullien, 2003; Hagiu, 2009; Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006; Nocke et al., 2007; Weyl, 2010).”
Information and Two-Sided Platform Profits (2014, background): “A majority of the recent literature on two-sided markets (e.g., Armstrong (2006), Armstrong and Wright (2007), Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Choi (2010), Hagiu (2009), Halaburda and Yehezkel (2013), Rochet and Tirole (2006), Weyl (2010)) also assumes responsive expectations.”
Two-sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts (2007, background): “Our framework encompasses special cases of Armstrong (2005), when there is strong product differentiation on both sides of the market, and Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003), when there is no product differentiation on either side of the market.”
The Market for Electric Vehicles: Indirect Network Effects and Policy Design (2017, neutral): “Our paper is also related to the emerging literature on two-sided markets that exhibit indirect network effects.5 Theoretical work includes Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Armstrong (2006), Hagiu (2006), Rochet and Tirole (2006), and Weyl (2010), and empirical work includes the PDA and compatible…”
Two-Sided Markets: An Overview ∗ (2004, methodology): “(i) The monopoly price per interaction, p = p + p, is given by the Lerner formula (p − c) /p = 1/η, and the price structure is given by condition (7).”
Two-Sided Markets: A Tentative Survey (2005, methodology): “This is the approach taken, for example, by Caillaud and Jullien (2003), where the realization of a transaction on an intermediation platform is probabilistic.8 Rochet and Tirole (2004) distinguish between “membership externality”, occurring when additional membership on one side benefit the…”
An Empirical Analysis of Payment Card Usage (2007, neutral): “Schmalensee (2002), Wright (2002), Caillaud and Julien (2003) and particularly Rochet and Tirole (2002, 2003) are important recent contributions.”
A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms (2010, background): “For example, if imperfect information is the cause, platforms and social welfare might actually be harmed by attempts to “solve” the deliberately designed critical mass problem!”
Why do intermediaries divert search (2009, background): “belonging to the interval ¤ 1 2  1 £ -, then the optimal level of search effectiveness ∗ is determined by the first order condition: −e 2 ¡ ( (∗))−  ¡¢¢+ [e 1 + (1− ∗) e 2]  −  (2− ∗)(2) | {z } 0(∗)  ( (∗)) = 0 (4)”