Two-sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts
By Mark Armstrong, Julian Wright. 2007
655 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Marketing, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/dce3e71cb4db09da238b90db53dd337ddfd8b9ac
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Julian Wright
- Andrei Hagiu
- Roberto Roson
- Xiaoyan Xu
- Mark Armstrong
- Ping He
- Guowei Dou
- Benjamin Edelman
In Marketing
- Andrei Hagiu
- Julian Wright
- Roberto Roson
- Xiaoyan Xu
- Ping He
- Guowei Dou
- Benjamin Edelman
- Hanna Halaburda
In Strategy and Management
- Roberto Roson
- Julian Wright
- Andrei Hagiu
- Xiaoyan Xu
- Ping He
- Guowei Dou
- Benjamin Edelman
- Mark Armstrong
Citations in the corpus
- Platform Competition: A Systematic and Interdisciplinary Review of the Literature (2020, neutral): “More recent research, however, has begun to focus on more complex interactions between differentiated platforms and complements and heterogeneous end-user demands (e.g., Armstrong & Wright, 2007; Tucker, 2008).”
- Two-Sided Markets: A Tentative Survey (2005, background): “More generally, the possibility of choosing between single and multihoming exacerbates the coordination problems faced by agents on both sides, thereby making the existence of multiple equilibria more likely (see, for example, Armstrong and Wright, 2004).”
- One-side value-added service investment and pricing strategies for a two-sided platform (2016, methodology): “Following many existing studies (Anderson and Coate 2005; Armstrong 2006; Armstrong and Wright 2007; Anderson, Parker, and Tan 2013), we assume that both uk and fm are uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1].”
- Mobile Call Termination (2009, positive): “See Armstrong (2006) and Armstrong and Wright (2007) for general analyses of competitive bottlenecks.”
- Price Coherence and Excessive Intermediation (2015, background): “This leads to a competitive bottleneck equilibrium similar to that analyzed in Armstrong and Wright (2007).”
- Platform Intermediation in a Market for Differentiated Products (2009, neutral): “Equations (3), (4), and (7) allow us to characterize the equilibria in the continuation game.”
- Information and Two-Sided Platform Profits (2014, background): “Comparing (14) with (4) and (7) yields:”