Optimal Sin Taxes
By Ted O’Donoghue, Matthew Rabin. 2006
547 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences, Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/66080167e9ab915fbb805b76f1ce587c74cc8655
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Joshua Schwartzstein
- B. Kőszegi
- George Loewenstein
- Paul Heidhues
- Sendhil Mullainathan
- Maria Börjesson
- W. Congdon
- Jonas Eliasson
In General Decision Sciences
- Joshua Schwartzstein
- Sendhil Mullainathan
- George Loewenstein
- Paul Heidhues
- B. Kőszegi
- W. Congdon
- N. Chater
- Jonas Eliasson
In Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment
- George Loewenstein
- B. Kőszegi
- Maria Börjesson
- Nicolas R. Ziebarth
- Susan Athey
- Péter Heindl
- Perry Sadorsky
Citations in the corpus
- Optimal Taxation with Behavioral Agents (2020, unknown): “(JEL: D03, H21).”
- On Behavioral-Environmental Economics (2008, background): “Another example is Aronsson and Thunström (2006), who construct an optimal tax-subsidy scheme for people who suffer from self-control problems that lead to obesity and poor health (also see the optimal sin tax discussion in O’Donoghue and Rabin 2006).”
- The value of time and external benefits in bicycle appraisal (2012, background): “A particularly relevant discussion is the literature on “sin taxes” (O’Donoghue & Rabin, 2006, 2003), where optimal policy rules are derived for situations where consumers do not have full information or self-control, and hence may act against their own best self-interest.”
- Putting nudges in perspective (2017, background): “Or consider Cell G, in which there is a behavioural economic rationale for an intervention, but the type of intervention is of the traditional economic variety (see O’Donoghue & Rabin, 2003, 2006, for a discussion of this situation).”
- The Pros and Cons of Sick Pay Schemes: Testing for Contagious Presenteeism and Noncontagious Absenteeism Behavior (2016, background): “2015; Marinescu 2017), endogenous private insurance (Chetty and Saez 2010), or unhealthy consumption goods (O’Donoghue and Rabin 2006).”
- Impatience, Incentives and Obesity (2015, unknown): “In a meta-analysis of experimental and eld studies on time preferences published from 1978-2002, Percoco and Nijkamp (2009) nd no evidence of changing time preferences.”
- Exploiting Naïvete about Self-Control in the Credit Market (2010, background): “Hence, arguments by O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006) in favor of a long-run perspective apply: in deciding how to weight any particular week of a person’s life”