The Antecedents of Institutional Investor Activism

By L. Ryan, Marguerite Schneider. 2002

291 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/63e7544f81070652c51c96169b9d6263e73f114c

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Citations in the corpus

Shame on Who? The Effects of Corporate Irresponsibility and Social Performance on Organizational Reputation (2019, unknown): “Corporate governance performance (CGV_SCORE), in turn, measures the proportion of equity held by long-term institutional investor groups, such as pension funds, insurance companies and life assurors (see also Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Ryan and Schneider, 2002) 3.”
Corporate charitable giving, multinational companies and countries of concern (2009, unknown): “Following, Ryan and Schneider (2002) and Johnson and Greening (1999), we employ a variable that equals the sum of the proportions of firm equity held by long-term institutional investor groups, i.e. pension funds, insurance companies and life assurors.”
Does Ownership Type Matter for Corporate Social Responsibility (2012, background): “Ryan and Schneider (2002) argue that investors’ propensity for activism is related to their portfolio, to market characteristics, and to characteristics of the investors themselves.”
Ownership as a Form of Corporate Governance (2010, unknown): “For example, different owners may use different tactics based on their interest, organizational characteristics, and power (Ryan and Schneider, 2002).”
The Impact of Corporate Social Performance on Financial Risk and Utility: A Longitudinal Analysis (2012, unknown): “…of socially responsible corporate activity, the stocks of firms with high levels of CSP might be attractive to specific types of institutional investors such as pension funds that “tend to have significantly predictable, long-term outflows to beneficiaries” (Ryan and Schneider, 2002, p.560).”
Shaping the shareholder activism agenda: institutional investors and global social issues (2006, background): “The largest pension funds with the widest scope of activity and the longest investment horizons are most likely to invest resources in activism with the expectation of a financial return (Ryan and Schneider, 2002).”
An Empirical Examination of Institutional Investor Preferences for Corporate Social Performance (2004, background): “The typology builds on recent conceptual work which has highlighted the diversity of institutional investors and argued that the behavior of institutional investors is conditioned by a complex set of characteristics (Ryan and Schneider, 2002).”
Identifying impediments to SRI in Europe: a review of the practitioner and academic literature (2008, background): “Ryan & Schneider (2002, 2003) draw attention to the organizational complexity and variety among institutional investors: private/public pension funds; mutual funds; insurance companies; and banks.”
Institutional investors, shareholder activism, and earnings management (2011, background): “…the late 1980s, shareholder activism has played a visible role in efforts to reform corporate governance structures and promote improvements in firm performance (Brav et al., 2008; Karpoff et al., 1996; Prevost & Rao, 2000; Ryan & Schneider, 2002; Smith, 1996; Strickland et al., 1996; Wahal, 1996).”
Institutional Investors and Institutional Environment: A Comparative Analysis and Review (2010, background): “As a result, they tend to have shorter investment time horizons (Ryan and Schneider, 2002).”