Do apes and children know what they have seen?
By J. Call, Malinda Carpenter. Animal Cognition, 2001
300 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Developmental and Educational Psychology, Social Psychology
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6288991f70624194e9be85aa79d39fdf343216a9
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Cognitive Neuroscience
- Michael Tomasello
- Claudia M. Roebers
- D. Broom
- Janet Metcalfe
- Robert A. Bjork
- J. Call
- Benjamin M. Hampstead
- Elisabeth A. Murray
In Developmental and Educational Psychology
- Michael Tomasello
- J. Call
- Peter Carruthers
- Claudia M. Roebers
- Á. Miklósi
- J. Topál
- Robert A. Bjork
- Janet Metcalfe
In Social Psychology
- D. Broom
- Michael Tomasello
- J. Call
- Oliver Burman
- Peter Carruthers
- Á. Miklósi
- J. Topál
- Elizabeth S. Paul
Citations in the corpus
- Dog-logic: inferential reasoning in a two-way choice task and its restricted use (2007, background): “Call & Carpenter (2001) reported that apes (chimpanzees and orang-utans) were correctly able to infer the location of food in one of several tubes based on the contents of the first tube(s) they looked into.”
- The Missing Link in Cognition: Origins of Self-Reflective Consciousness (2005, background): “Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory.”
- Cognitive ability and awareness in domestic animals and decisions about obligations to animals (2010, background): “A narrower definition proposed here is: cognition is having a representation in the brain of an object, event or process in relation to others, where the representation can exist whether or not the object, event or process is directly detectable or actually occurring at the time.”
- Visual perspective taking in dogs (Canis familiaris) in the presence of barriers (2004, unknown): “Moreover, chimpanzees knowledge extends into knowledge about what they themselves have seen, not just what others can or cannot see (Call and Carpenter, 2001).”
- Executive function and metacognition: Towards a unifying framework of cognitive self-regulation (2017, background): “…paradigms that include natural indicators of metacognitive control, such as help seeking (Coughlin et al., 2014), information seeking (e.g., Call & Carpenter, 2001), or optingout (Balcomb & Gerken, 2008; Bernard et al., 2015), have successfully explored metacognitive skills in younger…”
- Meta-cognition in Animals: A Skeptical Look (2008, background): “In this section I shall first discuss the studies of knowledge-seeking in conditions of uncertainty conducted by Call and Carpenter (2001) with apes and by Hampton et al. (2004) with monkeys, which are claimed to demonstrate that these animals know when they do and don't have the knowledge that…”
- Handbook of Metamemory and Memory (2013, background): “Call and Carpenter (2001) were among the first researchers to systematically attempt to investigate whether any nonhumans have metacognition.”
- Rhesus Monkeys (Macaca Mulatta) Demonstrate Robust Memory for What and Where, but Not When, in an Open-Field Test of Memory. (2005, methodology): “This emerging body of work suggests that some nonhuman primates have metamemory, a form of metacognition that likely depends on explicit representation (Call & Carpenter , 2001; Hampton, 2001, 2003; Hampton, Zivin, & Murray, 2004; Smith, Shields, & Washburn, 1998, 2003 ).”
- Do chimpanzees know what others see – or only what they are looking at? (2006, background): “Call and Carpenter (2001) presented chimpanzees and orang-utans with two hollow tubes perpendicularly oriented toward the subjects and then they placed a reward inside one of the tubes.”
- Cognitive bias as an indicator of animal emotion and welfare: Emerging evidence and underlying mechanisms (2009, background): “In fact, contemporary researchers, including animal welfare scientists, are increasingly seeking parallels between humans and animals in their studies of emotion, cognition, consciousness and mind (e.g. Clark and Squire, 1998; Call and Carpenter, 2001; Desiré et al., 2002; Garner et al., 2003; Smith”