Dividends and Expropriation

By Mara Faccio, Larry H. P. Lang, L. Young. 2001

1,816 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/614dcaba494b8e021f6d73802031024565fa6513

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Citations in the corpus

How Do Family Ownership, Control, and Management Affect Firm Value? (2006, positive): “Both dividends and debt can play a role in limiting minority shareholder expropriation by removing corporate wealth from family control (Jensen, 1986; Faccio et al., 2001).”
Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy in Poland (2007, neutral): “2 Introduction The existing empirical literature often finds statistically controversial effects of corporate governance on firm performance and dividend policy in developed countries (Gompers et al., 2003). In contrast, transition economies may offer more fertile ground for study, because they ofte”
Ownership structure, control contestability, and corporate debt maturity (2015, background): “Several empirical studies show that large shareholders may choose to collude to consume private benefits of control, which results in lower firm value (Maury and Pajuste, 2005) and lower dividend rates (Faccio et al., 2001).”
Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance and Company Performance in China (2007, background): “Faccio et al. (2001) find that the level of government shareholding is well below family shareholding in the ‘stockmarket-driven’ economies, ‘bank-driven’ economies and the ‘crony capitalistic’ economies.”
Corporate Governance and the Returns on Investment* (2004, neutral): “Recent research has focused on the conflict between managers and shareholders over dividend payments (LLSV, 2000; Faccio et al., 2001; Gugler and Yurtoglu, forthcoming).”
Creditor Rights, Enforcement, and Bank Loans (2009, neutral): “1 Recent research shows that secure property rights are associated with higher values of stock markets (La Porta et al. (1997)); a higher number of listed firms (La Porta et al.”
Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence From Public Companies in Chile (2007, background): “Some studies report that family control leads to wealth expropriation in the presence of less than transparent financial markets (e.g., Faccio et al., 2001).”
The Impact of Corporate Governance on IFRS Adoption Choices (2013, background): “On the other hand, this voting power breeds other agency problems if large shareholders can extract private benefits of control at the expense of minority shareholders (Faccio et al., 2001; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).”
Family Ownership and Control, the Presence of Other Large Shareholders, and Firm Performance: Further Evidence (2011, background): “Accordingly, Faccio et al. (2001) state that politically powerful families in control of public firms have been able to expropriate minority shareholders in East Asia where transparency is low, and Maury (2006) reports that family control may harm minority shareholders because of the risk of…”