Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies

By Marianne Bertrand, Antoinette Schoar. 2003

1,932 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5f4937429036586be7c0fb5f7ddf923a67f11c4b

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Citations in the corpus

Do CFOs Have Style? An Empirical Investigation of the Effect of Individual CFOs on Accounting Practices* (2011, methodology): “Nevertheless, because it provides a potentially more powerful test (by measuring both observable and unobservable manager-specific effects), we adopt the approach used in Bertrand and Schoar 2003.”
Managerial Ability and Earnings Quality (2013, background): “(2008) and DeJong and Ling (2009) examine manager fixed effects on certain financial reporting policies, and, similar to Bertrand and Schoar, document that individual managers matter: firms’ accounting and disclosure policies vary with manager fixed effects. Ge et al. (2008) find that”
Managerial Risk Taking (2016, neutral): “…on educational experience indicates that while more years of formal education lead to greater innovations (Thomas et al., 1991), MBA degrees may (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Palmer & Barber, 2001) or may not (Barker & Mueller, 2002; Geletkanycz & Black, 2001; Grimm & Smith, 1991) relate to risk…”
Managerial Overconfidence and Corporate Policies (2007, neutral): “In a previous study, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) document that managers have their own unique personal style which helps to explain the cross-section of corporate policies.”
The Impact of CFO Gender on Bank Loan Contracting (2013, neutral): “, Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Bennedsen et al.”
It Pays to Write Well (2017, neutral): “The average Tobin's Q in our sample is 1.892, which is similar to the average reported by prior studies that analyze the full CRSP/Compustat universe (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar, 2003).”
Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities (2012, neutral): “Such empirical work has a strong tradition, from at least Mundlak (1961) through at least Bertrand and Schoar (2003).”
Diagnosing Discrimination: Stock Returns and CEO Gender (2006, neutral): “Financial markets provide continuous measures of the market’s perception of the value of firms, taking account of the beliefs of market participants about the ability of the men and women in senior management.”
Corporate Financial Policies with Overconfident Managers (2005, methodology): “Then, using equations (7) and (8) and constraint (3), the maximand becomes”
The perfect finance minister: Whom to appoint as finance minister to balance the budget? (2014, neutral): “Bertrand and Schoar (2003) examine the impact of the CEO and show that her educational background, her age and her tenure are substantially relevant for several corporate decisions on investments, cash holdings or the debt leverage.”
Monitoring Managers: Does it Matter? (2013, positive): “In this sense, our results confirm that “CEOs matter” (Bertrand and Schoar (2003)).”