Corporate Financial Policies with Overconfident Managers
By Ulrike Malmendier, Geoffrey A. Tate, Jonathan Yan. 2005
118 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8de9fa2596addbaede82ed352df80e2d500f693d
How researchers see this paper
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In Accounting
- Murray Z. Frank
- Vidhan K. Goyal
- Mark T. Leary
- Michael R. Roberts
- Murillo Campello
- Vahap Bülent Uysal
- Maria Psillaki
- Heitor Almeida
In Finance
- Murray Z. Frank
- Vidhan K. Goyal
- Murillo Campello
- Michael R. Roberts
- Maria Psillaki
- Vahap Bülent Uysal
- Alexei V. Ovtchinnikov
- S. Alex Yang
Citations in the corpus
- Managerial Traits and Capital Structure Decisions (2008, unknown): “…beliefs, an (over-) optimistic manager exhibits an upward bias 6For example, recent empirical studies by Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2006) and Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2006) provide strong support for the view that overconfident and optimistic managers bias corporate financial…”
- Managerial Overconfidence and Corporate Policies (2007, unknown): “They show that biased managers exhibit high investment-cash flow sensitivity (Malmendier and Tate 2005a), engage intensively in unsuccessful mergers and acquisitions (Malmendier and Tate 2006), and avoid tapping the capital markets (Malmendier, Tate, and Yan 2006). Using Malmendier and Tate’s news-b”
- Trade-Off and Pecking Order Theories of Debt (2007, background): “Malmendier et al. (2005) report that, as an empirical matter, overconfident CEOs are more likely than other CEOs to raise debt (rather than equity) to cover financing deficit.”