Monitoring Managers: Does it Matter?

By Francesca Cornelli, Zbigniew Kominek, Alexander P. Ljungqvist. 2013

224 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b05c5be7e3d8c2275767a9b2983606b5a7e58399

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Citations in the corpus

Informational Holdup and Performance Persistence in Venture Capital (2014, unknown): “When a GP raises his first fund, his skill is unknown and so he faces a large set of potential investors in a perfectly 1 For empirical evidence of the importance of soft information in learning about corporate managers’ skill, see Cornelli, Kominek, and Ljungqvist (2013).”
Venture Capital and Other Private Equity: A Survey (2011, unknown): “(Cornelli et al. 2010), using East European VC investment data, document disciplinary roles (manager evaluation and firing) played by VC-backed company boards.”
Does Takeover Activity Cause Managerial Discipline? Evidence from International M&A Laws (2015, unknown): “For example, Cornelli et al. (2013) employ governance law enactments that facilitate board power in transition countries that did not have a prior legal basis for boards.”
A Corporate Culture Channel: How Increased Shareholder Governance Reduces Firm Value (2013, background): “…empirical research suggests that the above proposals have real effects on executive decisions (e.g., Bebchuk and Cohen (2005); Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrel (2009); Cornelli, Kominek, and Ljungqvist (2013) ), and thereby may also impact managerial and board actions with regard to corporate culture.”
Governmental and independent venture capital investments in Europe: a firm-level performance analysis (2017, methodology): “More specifically, we estimated two pooled IV linear probability models (for a similar procedure, see Cornelli et al., 2013) with standard errors clustered at portfolio company-level in which the dependent variables are the likelihood of a positive exit and the likelihood of a negative exit,…”
Bank Risk Taking and Liquidity Creation Following Regulatory Interventions and Capital Support (2011, unknown): “Plausibly, when boards discover problems, they may dismiss executives (Cornelli et al., 2013).”