Obtaining a Driver's License in India: An Experimental Approach to Studying Corruption

By Marianne Bertrand, Simeon Djankov, Rema Hanna, Sendhil Mullainathan. 2007

471 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5f265345d3fdaf9643eadcb5a6846bebc557b38b

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Citations in the corpus

Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment (2009, methodology): “¥ We assume that εigt and νagt are independent and normally distributed, hence we estimate (7) and (8) separately by ordinary least squares and by probit, respectively.”
Building connections: Political corruption and road construction in India (2018, background): “Bertrand et al., 2007; Olken and Barron, 2009). 5 Ethnic favoritism is not specific to democracies. Burgess et al. (2014) show that the ethnic homelands of Kenyan presidents receive preferential coverage by road projects, but only under autocracy. Kramon and Posner (2016) show similar favouritism in”
Propensities to engage in and punish corrupt behavior: Experimental evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore (2009, background): “Bertrand et al. (2007) and Olken (2007) analyze corruption using field experiments. Bertrand et al. (2007) study the allocation of driving licenses in India, and find that corruption”
Greasing the Wheels of Change: Bribery, Institutions, and New Product Introductions in Emerging Markets (2019, methodology): “Although from a theoretical perspective, prior literature has proposed a variety of alternative explanations (Svensson, 2003; Bertrand et al., 2007; Galang, 2012) that trump the effects of formal institutions, I also test it empirically using the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test for endogeneity, as discussed ”
Corruption, Institutions, and Economic Development (2009, background): “Bertrand et al. (2007), for example, study corruption in the driving licensing process in Delhi.”
Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments (2011, unknown): “…in their second term (who face a term-limit) to identify the effects of re-election 1See for example Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003), Olken (2007), Reinikka and Svensson (2004) 2See Knack and Keefer (1995), Mauro (1995), Bertrand et al. (2007) for studies examining the impacts of corruption.”
Corruption and firm behavior: Evidence from African ports (2014, background): “Bertrand et al. (2007) provides experimental evidence on how bureaucrats undercut existing regulations on obtaining a driver’s license in India, in a form of collusive corruption that responds to the needs of private agents but at a potentially high social cost.”
Corruption, investments and contributions to public goods: Experimental evidence from rural Liberia (2014, unknown): “to extract greater payments––creating “endogenous red tape” (Bertrand et al. 2007).”