Corruption, Institutions, and Economic Development

By Toke S. Aidt. 2009

768 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Information Systems, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ad113c20f0ec46d1d66ca64c9282e79902aeaf87

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Citations in the corpus

Size matters: entrepreneurial entry and government (2012, background): “Even where corruption “greases the wheels of commerce”, it typically has a negative effect on economic development (Wei 2000; Aidt 2009).”
Foreign direct investment, institutional quality, economic freedom and entrepreneurship in emerging markets (2014, neutral): “Consequently, there is no incentive to an honest entrepreneur—onewho is not open to corruption (Aidis & Adachi, 2007; Aidis et al., 2008; Aidt, 2009).”
How Does Corruption Affect Public Debt? An Empirical Analysis (2017, background): “…the existing theoretical findings and empirical evidence indicate that the growth effect of corruption depends on the institutional environment (Aidt, 2009; De Rosa, Gooroochurn, & Gorg, 2010; Méon & Weill, 2010, Meon and Sekkat, 2005; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999;…”
Corruption and economic growth: New empirical evidence (2019, neutral): “Examples include Paldam (2002 and 2019), Aidt (2009), Goel and Nelson (2010), Lessmann and Markwardt (2010), Méon and Weill (2010), Bjørnskov (2012), Potrafke (2012a and 2019), Cooray and Schneider (2018), Debski et al. (2018), and Vadlamannati and Cooray (2016).”
Quality of government and regional resilience in the European Union. Evidence from the Great Recession (2019, background): “Likewise, there are numerous studies showing the existence of a negative association between corruption and economic performance (e.g. Mauro, 1995; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; Aidt, 2009).”
Improving Governance for the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals: Scenario Forecasting the Next 50 years (2015, background): “…in governance whereby people with elite or family connections can procure special favors denied to others (Weber, 1978, p. 958).4 Such favoritism in the form of government corruption wastes public resources, damages state legitimacy, and weakens social trust (Aidt, 2009; Rothstein, 2011).”