Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment

By O. Bandiera, Andrea Prat, Tommaso M. Valletti. 2009

484 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e5817ef624c3c77d54ff64e3d3f830c0e12c87ec

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Citations in the corpus

Obtaining a Driver's License in India: An Experimental Approach to Studying Corruption (2007, result): “Examining the subset of participants who began the process by taking the driving test once, we find that a substantial percentage of them (about 35%) failed and must resort to retaking the test or hiring an agent. Most interestingly, this percentage is unrelated to actual ability to drive: it is con”
Can Electronic Procurement Improve Infrastructure Provision? Evidence From Public Works in India and Indonesia (2014, unknown): “For road projects (which represent a subset of all projects covered by the Ministry of Public Works), we have a separate database from the road division that tracks the start dates and expected and actual completion dates for the services associated with each contract.”
Corruption in Developing Countries (2012, unknown): “Of course, not all price markups are corruption—they could simply reflect incompetence or a lack of incentives in obtaining good prices for the government (see, for instance, Bandiera et al (2009)).”
Discretion and Supplier Selection in Public Procurement (2020, unknown): “, between passive and active waste as defined in Bandiera et al., 2009). Last, but not least, our results show that strategic behaviors by public administrations have to be seriously taken into account when dealing with public procurement data. As in Palguta and Pertold (2017), we find evidence of s”
Chapter 6 – The Personnel Economics of the Developing State (2017, background): “Banerjee et al. (2015) report on a field experiment which evaluated an e-governance reform of the fund-flow system for the federal workfare program in the Indian state of Bihar. The reform changed the traditional fund-flow practice by instead conditioning fund disbursement for wage payments on incur”
Publicity requirements in public procurement: Evidence from a regression discontinuity design ☆ (2012, background): “Bandiera et al. (2009) and Ferraz and Finan (2011) document the incidence of corruption on public spending analyzing public procurement data for Italy and Brazil, respectively. (3)Despite the fact that Li and Zheng (2009) and Marmer et al. (2013) use the same data set, the two papers disagree on whe”
Taking State-Capacity Research to the Field: Insights from Collaborations with Tax Authorities (2019, unknown): “See e.g. Bandiera et al. (2009), Lewis-Faupel et al. (2016), Gerardino et al., (2017).”
Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection (2013, unknown): “Indeed, empirical evidence about Italy shows that passive waste—that is, inefficiency due to red tape—is concentrated on expenditures for goods and services at the local level (Bandiera, Prat, and Valletti, 2009).”
Reputation, Competition, and Entry in Procurement (2012, unknown): “They also seem to square well with Bandiera et al.’s (2009) finding that public bodies with more autonomy/discretion were not more corrupt but were significantly more efficient in procuring public goods and services in Italy during about the same period.”
From Corruption to State Capture (2016, background): “With the recent availability of reliable microlevel data on corruption and favoritism in public procurement (Auriol, Flochel, and Straub 2011; Bandiera, Prat, and Valletti 2009; Klasnja 2016), scholars can begin to rigorously test theories of state capture, and investigate underlying actor networks…”