Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments

By C. Ferraz, Frederico Finan. 2011

984 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e790c227c0220ba5ff85b9c55feeb32cf201f729

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Citations in the corpus

Monitoring Corruptible Politicians (2016, methodology): “…documenting how electoral accountability, and monitoring in particular, influences political corruption.6 Most notably, in a series of papers Ferraz and Finan (2008; 2011) use similar measures of corruption from audit reports of municipal governments in Brazil to study whether electoral…”
Tying Your Enemy's Hands in Close Races: The Politics of Federal Transfers in Brazil (2012, background): “(18)Ferraz and Finan (2011) use random corruption audit reports to show that political accountability is lower in municipalities without a local radio station.”
Audit risk and rent extraction: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in Brazil (2018, background): “Even if funds are not reduced, voters may react to the mere release and local dissemination of audit ndings by updating their views on the quality of the incumbent mayor (Ferraz and Finan 2011).”
The Happiness Gap in Eastern Europe (2016, neutral): “Following the approach in Ferraz and Finan (2008, 2011), we use this information to create an objective - as opposed to a perception-based - measure of corruption, which sums all the infringements recorded in a municipality between 2004 and 2005.”
Institutional Corruption and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan† (2015, background): “Free and fair elections may place limits on this ( see, for example, Ferraz and Finan 2008, 2011 , and so patron-age networks might have incentives to coordinate when capturing elections.”
Publicity requirements in public procurement: Evidence from a regression discontinuity design ☆ (2012, background): “Bandiera et al. (2009) and Ferraz and Finan (2011) document the incidence of corruption on public spending analyzing public procurement data for Italy and Brazil, respectively.”
The Incumbency Curse: Weak Parties, Term Limits, and Unfulfilled Accountability (2017, background): “Consistent with our framework, Ferraz and Finan (2011) have shown that Brazilian mayors engage in higher corruption in their last term (see also Zamboni and Litschig 2014).”