The Economic Effects of Constitutions: What Do the Data Say

By Torsten Perrson, Guido Tabellini. 2003

151 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5edd8658fa563e8f232b9f5f5be61b5bb7fe5c6b

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Citations in the corpus

Segregation and the Quality of Government in a Cross-Section of Countries (2011, unknown): “[23] Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini, The Economic E¤ects of Constitutions: What Do the Data Say?, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2003.”
Constitutions and the resource curse (2008, methodology): “As a robustness check that the IV-results above are not con ned to the particular choice of instrument, we re-run the IV-regressions using the battery of instruments proposed by Persson and Tabellini (2003).”
Political Budget Cycles in New Versus Established Democracies (2005, unknown): “9 We were unable to reproduce some of the results of Persson and Tabellini (2003), who, in contrast to our results and those of Shi and Svensson, found no deficit cycle.”
Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: Theory and evidence (2010, background): “Persson and Tabellini (2003) nd a pre-election expansion in welfare state spending before elections in democracies with proportional electoral regimes, but no statistically signi cant pre-election expansion in overall spending nor de cits in these countries.”
Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Resource Abundance, Dependence and the Onset of Civil Wars (2009, methodology): “Finally, we use a dummy variable for a presidential-type system of government (presidential), based on seminal contributions by Persson and Tabellini (2003),”
Political budget cycles in the European Union and the impact of political pressures (2011, background): “Persson and Tabellini (2002, 2003) argue that the nature of the political system may shape fiscal policy outcomes.”
The resource curse revisited and revised (2006, unknown): “[39,40]; nevertheless, the classifications for the relevant years differ for three countries in our sample: Greece, Nepal, and Portugal.”
Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule (2004, background): “While the academic study of strongly-institutionalized polities is well advanced (e.g. Shepsle and Weingast, 1995, Cox, 1997, Persson and Tabellini, 2000, 2003), there are few studies, and less of a consensus, on the nature of weakly-institutionalized polities.”
From the Ballot to the Blackboard: The Redistributive Political Economy of Education (2010, background): “Many studies of electoral institutions either simply make broad correlatory statements about the relationship between electoral institutions and public spending, without specifying clear causal mechanisms (Persson and Tabellini, 2003) or rely on purely cross-sectional data which does not permit us t”
Agricultural technology adoption and poverty reduction: A propensity-score matching analysis for rural Bangladesh (2007, background): “If we allow for interactions between technology adoption and other covariates, then comparing income of adopters and non-adopters – even controlling for all determinants of adoption may be a ‘‘non-sense’’ since we would ‘‘compare incomparable things’’ (Persson and Tabellini, 2002).”