Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: Theory and evidence

By Allan Drazen, M. Eslava. 2010

689 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/eaffab48389fcd485c852adb49f156c276e659e2

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

In Political Science and International Relations

Citations in the corpus

Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus (2016, background): “…by the incumbent: for example, van Dalen and Swank (1996), Kneebone and McKenzie (2001), Galli and Rossi (2002), Serritzlew (2005), Veiga and Veiga (2007a, 2007b), Vergne (2009), Drazen and Eslava (2010), Katsimi and Sarantides (2012), Enkelmann and Leibrecht (2013), Brender and Drazen (2013).”
Is There an Election Cycle in Public Employment? Separating Time Effects from Election Year Effects (2011, background): “…Case (1995), Persson and Tabellini (2000), and Drazen and Eslava (2005), there is a large and growing empirical literature studying the effects of elections on public policy (see, e.g., Shi and Svensson, 2006, and Drazen and Eslava, 2010, for two recent studies and for references to earlier work).”
Fiscal policy and reelection in Brazilian municipalities (2008, background): “On the other hand, this result is opposite to that found by Drazen and Eslava (2005) for the Colombian municipalities, for instance.”
Opportunistic and partisan election cycles in Brazil: new evidence at the municipal level (2011, background): “These results are similar to those reported by Veiga and Veiga ( 2007) and Drazen and Eslava (2010) , who find that local governments systematically change the composition of expenditures in election years.”
Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in developed, established democracies? (2010, neutral): “Moreover, in Drazen and Eslava (2010) , voters have specific preferences over the composition of public spending but cannot observe the preferences of politicians.”
Political Budget Cycles: Evidence from Italian Cities (2017, background): “…budgets.6 Evidence of local political budget cycles is also found by Reid (1998) and Kneebone and McKenzie (2001) for Canadian provinces, and by Drazen and Eslava (2010) for Colombia.7 Foremny and Riedel (2014) document evidence of political budget cycles in a sample of German municipalities…”
Conditional political budget cycles: a review of recent evidence (2013, positive): “Hence, electoral manipulation is present, but does not necessarily show up in aggregate expenditure (Drazen and Eslava 2006, 2010).5 Some recent studies based on regional data provide support for this argument, i.e., they find no evidence of a cycle in aggregate spending but identify…”
The Political Economy of Government Debt (2015, neutral): “Peltzman (1992), and Drazen and Eslava (2010) perform an analogous analysis in the United States and Colombia, respectively.”
The State of State Capacity : a review of concepts, evidence and measures (2013, background): “A critical and systematic discussion on the concept of neopatrimonialism and its derivations can be found in Erdmann and Engel (2007) and for Africa in particular in Bach (2011).”
Does government ideology influence budget composition? Empirical evidence from OECD countries (2010, background): “…Sakamoto (2008), Heckelman (2002), Tavares (2004), Bjørnskov (2008a), Potrafke (2011b).4 In addition to determining the size of the budget, parties also determine the allocation of specific government spending with a view to gratifying their clientele (Bräuninger 2005, Drazen and Eslava 2010).”
How Do Budget Deficits and Economic Growth Affect Reelection Prospects? Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries (2008, background): “Peltzman (1992), Brender (2003), and Drazen and Eslava (2007) examine the direct effect of fiscal performance on reelection at the state and local level in a single country (the United States, Israel, and Colombia respectively), and find that voters punish – rather than reward – loose fiscal…”