Do Changes in Democracy Affect the Political Budget Cycle? Evidence from Mexico
By M. González. 2002
261 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5ed9d12ee34a7e56dea6bff77211d1443bd32a0b
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Sérgio Naruhiko Sakurai
- N. Menezes-Filho
- Eric Dubois
- Allan Drazen
- M. Eslava
- Jakob Svensson
- Min Shi
- Mark A. Kayser
In Political Science and International Relations
- Sérgio Naruhiko Sakurai
- N. Menezes-Filho
- Eric Dubois
- Allan Drazen
- M. Eslava
- A. Akhmedov
- Min Shi
- Mark A. Kayser
Citations in the corpus
- Opportunistic and partisan election cycles in Brazil: new evidence at the municipal level (2011, background): “More recently, Gonzalez (2002) evaluated the fiscal policy of the Mexican central government and also found evidence of opportunistic changes in election years. These results are in line with those identified by Grier (2008), who finds that the timing of elections exerts a significant influence on t”
- Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting (2004, background): “3 See evidence and discussion in Brender and Drazen (2003) as well as evidence produced by Gonzalez (2002), Krueger and Turan (1993), Drazen and Eslava (2003), Block (2001), Block, et al. (2001), Shi and Svensson (2002a), and Shi and Svensson (2002b).”
- Political Budget Cycles: A Review of Recent Developments (2003, background): “Gonzalez (2002b) incorporates the cost of removing a policymaker from office (the “degree of democracy”) and the probability that voters learn the incumbent’s competence costlessly (“transparency”) in a Rogoff (1990) type signaling model of political budget cycles. Her model predicts that electoral ”
- Counting Calories: Democracy and Distribution in the Developing World (2011, background): “A number of studies find evidence of budget cycles in authoritarian Mexico (Grier and Grier 2000; Gonzalez 2002; Magaloni 2006).”
- Political Budget Cycles in New Versus Established Democracies (2005, unknown): “Individual country studies arguing for a significant political fiscal cycle include Ben-Porath (1975) for Israel over the period 1952-73, Krueger and Turan (1993) for Turkey over the period 1950-1980, and Gonzàlez (2002) for Mexico over the period 1958-1997, to name a few.”
- Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why? (2006, methodology): “Studies using data from developing countries include Block (2002), Gonzalez (2002b), Magloire (1997), Khemani (2000), Kraemer (1997), Schuknecht (1996).”
- Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus (2016, background): “Nevertheless, it has been shown that PBCs occur even in non- democratic systems: in Egypt (Blaydes 2011), in Mexico (Gonzalez 2002), in China (Guo 19 See also the panel data studies of Alesina et al. (1997) and Palmer and Whitten (2000).”
- Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in developed, established democracies? (2010, unknown): “4Studies that find strong support for opportunistic cycles in young and imperfect democracies include Schuknecht (2000), Block (2002), Gonzalez (2002), Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004), Brender and Drazen (2005), and Shi and Svensson (2006).”
- Conditional political budget cycles: a review of recent evidence (2013, unknown): “Gonzales (2002) tests whether a country’s time-varying degree of democracy affects the way in which economic policy is chosen as elections approach.”