Conditional Political Budget Cycles

By Min Shi, Jakob Svensson. 2002

138 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Citations in the corpus

Political Budget Cycles in New Versus Established Democracies (2005, methodology): “It equals 1 in an election year and 0 otherwise, no matter when during the year the election occurred. However, we adjust the electoral year definition to be consistent with the fiscal year, when fiscal data are reported for a fiscal year different than the calendar year. Election dates and institut”
Do political variables affect fiscal policy adjustment decisions? New empirical evidence (2007, methodology): “Table 2 shows the results if we use the definition of an adjustment as suggested by von Hagen et al. (2001), while in Table 3 the definition of fiscal adjustment of Heylen and Everaert (2000) is used; the first captures rapid adjustments whereas the latter captures gradual adjustments.”
Do Electoral Cycles Differ Across Political Systems (2003, result): “…that electoral accountability, and hence corruption, wasteful spending and taxes, differ 1Among the more recent studies on international data, Shi and Svensson (2001) analyze a large panel of developed and developing countries, focusing on how electoral cycles interact with voters’ access to…”
Fighting with one hand tied behind the back: political budget cycles in the West German states (2009, background): “This is what scholars dub ‘hidden effort’ (Persson and Tabellini 2002; Shi and Svensson 2002; Mink and de Haan 2005).”
Fiscal Transparency, Political Parties, and Debt in OECD Countries (2003, unknown): “In this section we introduce a career-concerns model of debt accumulation, following Shi and Svensson (2002) and Persson and Tabellini (2000, ch. 4), and extend it to contain partisan politics.”
Political Budget Cycles: A Review of Recent Developments (2003, methodology): “Shi and Svensson (2002a) use GMM technique and find that on average, fiscal deficit increases by 1 percentage point of GDP in election years.”
ELECTORAL AND PARTISAN CYCLES IN ECONOMIC POLICIES AND OUTCOMES (2002, background): “…1992; Alesina et al. 1992, 1997; Krueger & Turan 1993; Schultz 1995; Fouda 1997; Price 1998; Brender 1999; Franzese 1999, 2002a,b; Gonzalez 1999a,b, 2000; Moyo 1999; Schuknecht 1999, 2000; Khemani 2000; Shi & Svensson 2001; Block 2001a,b; Block et al. 2001; Harrinvirta & Mattila 2001; Clark 2002).”
Political budget cycles in the European Union and the impact of political pressures (2011, methodology): “Bun and Kiviet (2006), who analyse the finite sample properties of various least squares 11To do so, we follow an approach similar to that adopted by Shi and Svensson (2002, 2006) and classify an election to be predetermined if either (i) the election occurs in the last year of a constitutional…”
What Promotes Fiscal Consolidation: OECD Country Experiences (2007, background): “Sutherland et al. (2005) provide a description of these rules and a discussion of the issues related to their design.”
Democracy, Elections and Allocation of Public Expenditure in Developing Countries (2009, background): “First, presidential regimes also know some endogeneous elections, particularly in developing countries (Shi and Svensson, 2002b).”