Funding Public Goods with Lotteries: Experimental Evidence

By John Morgan, Martin Sefton. 2000

160 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Clinical Psychology, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5ce6c8458f20dd49c46eadac5135aa5b12d987c8

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Clinical Psychology

1. Roman M. Sheremeta
2. John Morgan

In General Decision Sciences

1. Dan Kovenock
2. Emmanuel Dechenaux
3. Roman M. Sheremeta
4. John Morgan
5. Subhasish M. Chowdhury

In Safety Research

1. Emmanuel Dechenaux
2. Dan Kovenock
3. Roman M. Sheremeta
4. John Morgan
5. Subhasish M. Chowdhury
6. Shakun D. Mago
7. Anya Samak

Citations in the corpus

• A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments (2014, background): “A number of lab experiments compare lotteries and all-pay auctions to the system of voluntary contributions (Morgan and Sefton 2000; Lange et al. 2007; Orzen 2008; Corazzini et al. 2010), and different types of winner-pay auctions (Davis et al. 2006; Schram and Onderstal 2009).27 There are also…”
• Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments (2013, unknown): “Similarly, in contests used to finance public goods (Morgan and Sefton, 2000) and raise money for charities (Landry et al., 2006), efforts provide significant positive externalities.”
• Contest Design: An Experimental Investigation (2009, unknown): “Finally, there is a strong heterogeneity between subjects and individual expenditures 1 Several experimental studies looked at the design of rank order tournaments (Orrison et al., 2004; Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2003, 2005) and fund-raising lotteries (Morgan and Sefton, 2000; Lange, 2007).”
• A Greater Price for a Greater Good? Evidence that Consumers Pay More for Charity-Linked Products (2010, unknown): “Examining efforts to generate a public good (rather than sell a private one), Morgan and Sefton (2000) and Landry et al. (2006) both provide experimental evidence that lotteries can generate more charity revenue than solicited direct donations.”
• Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries (2000, background): “Morgan and Sefton (2000) show that changes in the desirability of the public good significantly affect betting behaviour.”