Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries

By John Morgan. 2000

298 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a44289d2e87d4bade14ecc318651422c1b046324

Citations in the corpus

• Contest Design: An Experimental Investigation (2009, unknown): “based funding mechanisms of public good provision (Morgan and Sefton, 2000; Morgan, 2000 ).”
• A Greater Price for a Greater Good? Evidence that Consumers Pay More for Charity-Linked Products (2010, unknown): “In theoretical studies of specific market mechanisms, Morgan (2000) examines lotteries that generate public goods, Goeree et al. (2005) and Engers and McManus (2007) study equilibrium bidding and revenue in charity auctions, and Bagnoli and Watts (2003) consider oligopoly competition and public…”
• Toward an Understanding of the Economics of Charity: Evidence from a Field Experiment (2006, unknown): “East Carolina University University of Maryland University of Chicago, NBER University of Nevada, Reno East Carolina University”