Investment Banking and Analyst Objectivity: Evidence from Analysts Affiliated with Mergers and Acquisitions Advisors

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The Effect of Disclosures by Management, Analysts, and Business Press on Cost of Capital, Return Volatility, and Analyst Forecasts: A Study Using Content Analysis (2009, background): “6 See Lin and McNichols (1998), Michaely and Womack (1999), Dechow et al. (2000), Bradshaw et al. (2003), O’Brien et al. (2005), Kolasinski and Kothari (2008), Clarke et al. (2007), and Ljungqvist et al. (2007).”
The Informational Role of Bond Analysts (2009, background): “An alternative explanation for the positive relation between affiliation and positively skewed recommendations, put forward by Kolasinski and Kothari (2008), is that there is no strategic behavior.”
When Firms are Desperate to Grow via Acquisition: The Effect of Growth Patterns and Acquisition Experience on Acquisition Premiums (2011, background): “For instance, the promise of merger and acquisition fees may coax advisors to compromise their objectivity as they issue positively biased recommendations based on overly optimistic growth projections (Kolasinski and Kothari, 2008).”
On the Information Role of Stock Recommendation Revisions (2009, background): “…Investor (I/I) and the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) (Stickel, 1992); promoting brokerage investment banking business (Lin and McNichols, 1998; Michaely and Womack, 1999; Ljungqvist et al., 2006; Kolasinski and Kothari, 2008); and boosting brokerage trading revenue (Jackson, 2005; Irvine et al., 2007).”