Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging Markets? An Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Groups

By Tarun Khanna, K. Palepu. 2000

2,642 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/58f238c3c3e75a3e236cacf9e0739d0e9e16fdb6

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Citations in the corpus

From diversification premium to diversification discount during institutional transitions (2008, background): “…Choi, 1988; Chang & Hong, 2000, 2002; Guillen, 2000; Hoskisson, Cannella, Tihanyi, & Faraci, 2004; Kedia, Mukherjee, & Lahiri, 2006; Keister, 2000; Khanna & Palepu, 2000a; Khanna & Palepu, 2000b; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Li & Wong, 2003; Ma K. Lee et al. / Journal of World Business 43 (2008) 47–65…”
Sustaining superior performance in an emerging economy: an empirical test in the Indian context (2012, methodology): “…group affiliation and foreign firm affiliation are indicator variables with a value of 1 for firms classified as affiliates of a business group and foreign firm respectively by the Center for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE), and 0 otherwise (Chacar and Vissa, 2005; Khanna and Palepu, 2000b).”
Retire in Peace: Officials’ Political Incentives and Corporate Diversification in China* (2018, background): “Unlike the institutional void perspective that views corporate diversification as a means to fill the void of market institutions in emerging/ transitional economies (Khanna and Palepu, 2000), our study suggests that existing state institutions in these markets engender corporate diversification in ”
Family Business Growth Around the World (2020, result): “Our findings contrast with those from the prior studies that found family firms doing well where there is an institutional void (Khanna & Palepu, 2000), likely because those studies have examined only developing nations rather than the combination of both developed and developing nations within a…”
Governance Structure, Innovation and Internationalization: Evidence from India (2013, neutral): “firms (Khanna and Palepu, 2000).”
Institutional exceptions on global projects: a process model (2008, background): “…of International Business Studies UN CO RR EC TE D PR OO F domestic or multinational entity (Henisz, 2003); whether the firm is affiliated with a business group (Khanna & Palepu, 2000); and whether the firm brings distinctive knowledge or has ties to powerful allies (Henisz & Zelner, 2005).”
Intragroup Propping: Evidence from the Stock-Price Effects of Earnings Announcements by Korean Business Groups (2008, positive): “Khanna and Palepu (1997, 2000), for example, argue that business groups in developing countries mimic the beneficial functions of market mechanisms that are present only in advanced economies.”
The motives and performance of cross-border acquirers from emerging economies: Comparison between Chinese and Indian firms (2013, background): “Historically, in their efforts to internationalize, emerging-market (EM) firms have used strategies ranging from exports to equity investment (Guillen, 2000) and joint ventures (Khanna & Palepu, 2000).”
Organizational slack and firm performance during institutional transitions (2009, background): “Third, due to the weak financial market infrastructure, it is often difficult for firms in transition economies to gain resources in the market ( Khanna & Palepu, 2000 ).”
Adoptive Expectations: Rising Sons in Japanese Family Firms (2013, positive): “…dysfunctional institutions, such as weak shareholder rights (La Porta et al. 1999; Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer 2003) or widespread corruption (Khanna and Palepu 2000; Khanna and Rivkin 2001), which correlate strongly with families dominating big business (La Porta et al. 1999; Fogel, 2007).”
Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment and Growth (2005, positive): “Khanna and Palepu (2000a) and Khanna and Rivkin (2001) both explain their findings by positing various arguments as to why the group structure might be an advantage in economies with poorly functioning markets and institutions that might cause unrelated firms to have difficulty writing and…”