Adoptive Expectations: Rising Sons in Japanese Family Firms
By Vikas Mehrotra, Randall K. Morck, J. Shim, Yupana Wiwattanakantang. 2013
231 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Management of Technology and Innovation, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c093fb08d0b85a9d63d76e7ba34d027b82e4b957
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Alfredo De Massis
- Ivan Miroshnychenko
- Gary Gang Tian
- Danny Miller
- R. Barontini
- Tianpei Luo
- Qigui Liu
- Sea-Jin Chang
In Management of Technology and Innovation
- Alfredo De Massis
- Danny Miller
- Qigui Liu
- Sea-Jin Chang
- Gary Gang Tian
- R. Barontini
- Ivan Miroshnychenko
- W. Wales
In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
- Alfredo De Massis
- Ivan Miroshnychenko
- Danny Miller
- R. Barontini
- Qigui Liu
- Sea-Jin Chang
- Gary Gang Tian
- J. Shim
Citations in the corpus
- Family Business Growth Around the World (2020, background): “It has also been argued that family firms can lack effective management because family top executives are drawn from a smaller talent pool than in nonfamily firms (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; Mehrotra et al., 2013; Miller et al., 2015).”
- Family control and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China (2015, background): “Previous literature has widely documented that the behavior of family firms are shaped by the culture, and psychological and social factors (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; Mehrotra et al., 2013; Gedajlovic et al., 2012; Bennedsen et al., 2014), so it is worthwhile investigating whether and how the unique”
- How Do CEOs See Their Roles? Management Philosophies and Styles in Family and Non-Family Firms (2013, unknown): “It is also in line with the idea in Shleifer and Summers (1988) that family control makes possible implicit or relational contracts with a firm’s workforce, and Mueller and Philippon’s (2011) argument for the beneficial effect on firms’ labor relations of family control.”
- When does transitioning from family to professional management improve firm performance (2015, background): “Some studies find that family firms outperform professionally managed firms due to low agency and long-term investment horizons (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Mehrotra et al., 2013).”