Intragroup Propping: Evidence from the Stock-Price Effects of Earnings Announcements by Korean Business Groups

By Gil S. Bae, Y. S. Cheon, Jun-Koo Kang. 2008

149 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1391c2575faaf774c1452158372d13728ca5b717

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Citations in the corpus

Do controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidence (2012, background): “1 See Bae, Cheon, and Kang (2008) for evidence on propping in Korean markets.”
Corporate governance in emerging markets: A survey (2013, unknown): “Indeed much evidence suggest that in the presence of large divergence between cash-flow rights and voting rights, group-affiliation has detrimental effects on stock valuation (Claessens et al. 2002; Joh 2003; Lefort 2005; Bae et al. forthcoming; Bae et al. 2008) and also on operating performance (Be”
A Reexamination of Tunneling and Business Groups: New Data and New Methods (2012, unknown): “Other papers that helped produce the conventional wisdom on tunneling and business groups (e.g., Bae et al. 2002, 2008; Baek et al., 2006) rarely if ever included firm fixed effects and rarely if ever included a comparison reference set of private stand-alones.”
How corporate governance affect firm value? Evidence on a self-dealing channel from a natural experiment in Korea (2015, unknown): “- 5 Within Korea, Bae et al., 2002 find negative share price reactions to the announcement of acquisitions by chaebol firms, but do not link tunneling to governance. Several papers study the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis. Mitton (2002) finds better share price performance for better-disclosing fi”
Business group affiliation, ownership structure, and the cost of debt (2013, methodology): “4 Korean data have also been used extensively in other studies on business groups (Almeida et al., 2011; Bae et al., 2002, 2008, 2012; Baek et al., 2004, 2006; Joh, 2003; Kim and Yi, 2006; Shin and Park, 1999).”