Conference Calls and Information Asymmetry
By Stephen J. Brown, Stephen A. Hillegeist, Kin Lo. 2004
445 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/58d3a0f1e0c7263d369056b739fdf50360b96f64
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In Accounting
- Qiang Cheng
- David F. Larcker
- Ryan Lafond
- Christian Leuz
- W. Guay
- Christopher S. Armstrong
- Peter D. Wysocki
- Katherine Schipper
In Finance
- Qiang Cheng
- David F. Larcker
- Katherine Schipper
- Per Olsson
- I. Wang
- Nilabhra Bhattacharya
- Frank Ecker
- Ryan Lafond
Citations in the corpus
- Do Family Firms Provide More or Less Voluntary Disclosure (2008, result): “Empirical evidence is generally consistent with these theoretical predictions (e.g., Botosan 1997; Healy, Hutton, and Palepu 1999; Brown et al. 2004).”
- Financial Reporting Frequency, Information Asymmetry, and the Cost of Equity (2012, unknown): “Prior literature (e.g., Leuz and Verrechia, 2000; Brown et al., 2005) argue that information asymmetry/cost of equity effect is more significant for the commitment to disclose than for a one-time change in firms’ disclosure practices.”
- Disclosure Measurement in the Empirical Accounting Literature - A Review Article (2010, background): “Some studies explicitly test whether the disclosure proxy is validly constructed; e.g., Botosan, 1997; Hail, 2002; Hope, 2003a; Brown et al., 2004.”
- Analyst Coverage and the Cost of Raising Equity Capital: Evidence from Underpricing of Seasoned Equity Offerings (2008, background): “3 For example, Coller and Yohn (1997), Brown et al. (2004), and others investigate the impact of management forecasts and conference calls; Botosan (1997), Healy et al. (1999), and others study the impact of disclosure quality.”
- On the Use of Instrumental Variables in Accounting Research (2010, background): “Moreover, prior literature argues that a commitment to disclosure rather than a one-time improvement in disclosure is what drives the cost of capital effect (e.g. Brown, Hillegeist, and Lo (2004)).”
- Earnings conference calls and stock returns: The incremental informativeness of textual tone (2012, unknown): “We recognize that releasing information publicly through conference call disclosures may preempt some future private information events, which potentially reduces information asymmetry between investors (Brown et al., 2004).”
- Deviations from Put-Call Parity and Stock Return Predictability (2010, unknown): “…bid-ask spread in puts, and the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio, which is the average ratio of absolute return to volume, and corresponds loosely to a Kyle (1985) lambda.15 The t-statistics that we report employ a 14 This is an updated version of the data used in Brown, Hillegeist, and Lo (2004).”
- The effect of earnings surprises on information asymmetry (2009, unknown): “We expect changes in informed trading resulting from changes in uninformed trading to be less than fully proportional, as shown in Brown et al. (2004), perhaps due to risk aversion and/or capital constraints.”
- Can Investors Detect Managers' Lack of Spontaneity? Adherence to Predetermined Scripts during Earnings Conference Calls (2016, unknown): “…in analyst forecast accuracy following the call (Bowen et al. 2002), more timely incorporation of earnings news into prices for firms initiating conference calls (Kimbrough 2005), and a reduction in information asymmetry for firms holding regular quarterly calls (Brown, Hillegeist, and Lo 2004).”
- The Effect of Reporting Frequency on the Timeliness of Earnings: The Cases of Voluntary and Mandatory Interim Reports (2007, unknown): “, 2002), and reduces information asymmetry (Welker, 1995; Healy et al., 1999; Brown et al., 2005).”
- Private Earnings Guidance and its Implications for Disclosure Regulation (2007, background): “Table 4 shows that of the pre-FD private disclosers that enter the post-FD period, 150 (44 percent) firms become post-FD new public disclosers and 191 (56 percent) become 30 See Easley et al. (1997), Easley et al. (1998), and Brown et al. (2004) for details about PIN estimation.”
- Evidence of Management Discrimination Among Analysts during Earnings Conference Calls (2008, background): “Brown et al. (2005) documents a dramatic increase in earnings conference calls since Regulation FD.”