The Economic Theory of Clubs

By G. Anderson, W. Shughart, R. Tollison. 2004

868 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Citations in the corpus

Social Capital, Human Capital and the Community Mechanism: Toward a Conceptual Framework for Economists (2009, background): “…attributes of joint use (non-rivalness) and externality (non-excludability) into ‘club goods’ (or ‘toll goods’) which are also characterised by joint use but involve no externality; namely, fees can be charged on the use of club goods unlike the case of ordinary public goods (Buchanan, 1965, 1968).”
What accountability pressures do MPs in Africa face and how do they respond? Evidence from Ghana* (2010, background): “Clubs, unlike generic collectives, can regulate such problems by, for example, imposing a fee so those with stronger preferences (or economic strength) can use it more frequently (see e.g. Buchanan 1965; Sandler 2001: 65–7; Tiebout 1956).”
The Dynamics of Motivation in New Organizational Forms (2002, background): “These resources are club goods in the sense of Buchanan (1965).”
Voting on Majority Rules (2004, background): “29See Buchanan (1965). many persons and who should be admitted to the club is of considerable importance, and members may have considerably differing tastes.”
Omnia Sunt Communia: On the Commons and the Transformation to Postcapitalism (2017, background): “Sharing a ‘haircut per month’ with a second person is the same as consuming ‘one-half haircut’ per month’ (Buchanan 1965: 3), the result of which would be people having longer hair on average.”
Causes of Sprawl: A Portrait from Space (2006, background): “While there are many microeconomic foundations for such economies (see Duranton and Puga [2004] and Rosenthal and Strange [2004] for reviews), perhaps the simplest is the existence of large indivisible public facilities [Buchanan 1965].”
Public/private in higher education: a synthesis of economic and political approaches (2018, background): “…’ s notion of public/private goods has led to variations, including common-pool goods, rivalrous but non-excludable, such as a ﬁ shing zone; Buchanan ’ s (1965) ‘ club goods ’ , excludable but non-rivalrous until congestion occurs; and Ostrom ’ s (2010) ‘ toll goods ’ , whereby all but a…”
Some Reflections on the Economic and Political Organisation of Private Neighbourhoods (2005, background): “Groups which collectively, but exclusively, share the consumption of specific goods on the basis of ownership-membership arrangements have been named ‘clubs’ and the excludable collective goods ‘club goods’ (Buchanan, 1965).”
The social economy of coworking spaces: a focal point model of coordination (2017, background): “Two, we expect coworking spaces to be rule-governed and club-like because they are essentially creating a common pool resource inside a club, which acts as a sorting and screening mechanism (Buchanan 1965; Ostrom 1990).”
Local public goods and clubs (2002, background): “Many of 10 This idea lies at the heart of the papers on clubs in economies with single private goods, in particular, Buchanan (1965), Pauly (1970a,b), Stiglitz (1977), Wooders (1978, 1981, 1980), Boadway (1982), Berglas and Pines (1981), Scotchmer and Wooders (1987a,b) and Conley and Wooders (1997).”
The Empirics of Agglomeration Economies (2014, unknown): “If one goes back as far as to Buchanan (1965), cities are places where firms and consumers share indivisible goods such as airports, universities, hospitals, which generate a first type of agglomeration economies.”
Sustainable (2014, unknown): “The findings indicated that around 64% of participants were engaged in study or employment in London, whilst the remainder mostly lived in Scotland or the Midwest area, as seen in Figure 2.”