Voting on Majority Rules

By Matthias Messner, Mattias Polborn. 2004

116 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3f33486c67837e68301a912d66d745a9637fd373

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Stefan Krasa
2. Mattias Polborn
3. Massimo Morelli
4. Andrea Mattozzi
5. Antonio Merlo

Citations in the corpus

• Competition between Specialized Candidates (2010, methodology): “…implementing their election platform would be detrimental in our framework.6 5 See www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=broderism 6 For a formal model that explains why supermajoritarian institutions may arise in spite of potentially detrimental welfare effects, see Messner and Polborn (2004).”
• Endogenous Political Institutions (2004, unknown): “However, they show that (0, 8/5].”
• Self Enforcing Voting in International Organizations (2006, background): “Other papers that provide theoretical justifications for (simple or super) majority rules are May [13], Rae [16], Taylor [19], Caplin and Nalebuff [7], Austen-Smith and Banks [2], Dasgupta and Maskin [9], and Messner and Polborn [14].”