Big Business Owners in Politics
By Pramuan Bunkanwanicha, Yupana Wiwattanakantang. 2009
279 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Political Science and International Relations, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8b30d375b1a50c261b79476d386d9945f5b930bb
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Citations in the corpus
- Political connections and the cost of equity capital (2012, unknown): “Political connections in fact benefit both parties (power/money exchange): While government officials hand out rewards (policies and privileges) to entrepreneurs for their political cooperation and their own benefit, the entrepreneurs make use of their political connections to enrich themselves (Bun”
- The Value of the Revolving Door: Political Appointees and the Stock Market (2012, unknown): “For Thailand, Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang (2009) find not only that higher wealth and dependence on regulated industries make business leaders more likely to run for public office, but that their firms gain in market value during their tenure.”
- The Value of Local Political Connections in a Low-Corruption Environment (2013, unknown): “Previous studies have identified the value of political connections in corrupt countries (e.g., Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Li, Meng, Wang and Zhou, 2008; Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang, 2009; and Cingano and Pinotti, 2013), for powerful national politicians (Jayachandran, 2006; and ”
- Textual analysis in finance (2019, background): “Corruption hampers economic growth (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993), but for the firms politically connected, the scheme can be beneficial (Faccio, 2006; Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang, 2009; Ovtchinnikov and Pantaleoni, 2012).”
- Political activity and firm performance within nonmarket research: A review and international comparative assessment (2015, unknown): “Weak systems of checks and balance are institutional voids that allow politicians and firms to extract economic rents and encourage business owners to enter politics for private gains (Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang, 2009).”
- Political Connections and the Process of Going Public: Evidence from China (2009, unknown): “Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang (2008) find that Thailand firms experience dramatic market value increases once their owner win the”
- Political uncertainty and cash holdings: Evidence from China (2016, background): “A firm can use political connections to enhance its operations and increase its value (Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006; Faccio et al., 2006; Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang, 2009).”
- Auditor Choice in Politically Connected Firms (2014, unknown): “More specifically, we consider size, leverage, the largest shareholder’s ownership stake, state ownership, and cross-listing as connected firms are likely to be different from non-connected peers along these characteristics (see, for example, Faccio, 2006, 2010; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Boubak”