Like me” as a building block for understanding other minds: Bodily acts, attention, and intention. Ed. Malle, BF, L. J. Moses, and DA Baldwin
By Andrew N. Meltzoff, Rechele Brooks. 2001
211 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/56e832a2fb82be841231051d1b7911ccd74f3cce
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Cognitive Neuroscience
- Marco Iacoboni
- Thomas Fuchs
- Mirella Dapretto
- Jason P. Mitchell
- Istvan Molnar-Szakacs
- Josh Tenenbaum
- Andrew N. Meltzoff
- Shaun Gallagher
Citations in the corpus
- Understanding Interpersonal Problems in Autism: Interaction Theory as An Alternative to Theory of Mind (2004, background): “The child, seeing an adult who tries to manipulate a toy in the right way and who appears frustrated about being unable to do so, quite readily picks up the toy and shows the adult how to do it (Meltzoff 1995; Meltzoff and Brooks 2001).”
- Dissociable medial prefrontal contributions to judgments of similar and dissimilar others. (2006, background): “The term was originally introduced by theorists to refer to circumstances in which one infers another’s thoughts or feelings by mentally imagining oneself in the same situation as a target (Adolphs, 2002; Davies and Stone, 1995a, 1995b; Gallese and Goldman, 1998; Gordon, 1992; Heal, 1986; Meltzoff a”
- 1 Imitation and Other Minds: The "Like Me" Hypothesis (2005, background): “Over the past decade, I have developed the thesis that infant imitation is connected with the perception of others as "like me" and understanding others' minds (Meltzoff, 1990; Meltzoff & Moore, 1995; Meltzoff & Brooks, 2001; Meltzoff, 2002a).”
- Understanding the Nature of Face Processing Impairment in Autism: Insights From Behavioral and Electrophysiological Studies (2005, background): “…neural systems that might be important for the perception of social reward such as ability to form representations of others as “like me,” that is, similar to self in some way (Decety, Chaminade, Grezes, & Meltzoff, 2002; Decety & Sommerville, 2003; Meltzoff & Brooks, 2001; Williams et al., 2001).”
- Dark, Beyond Deep: A Paradigm Shift to Cognitive AI with Humanlike Common Sense (2020, background): “By the age of 10 months, infants segment continuous behavior streams into units that correspond to what adults would see as separate goal-directed acts, rather than mere spatial or muscle movements [305,306].”
- Self-face recognition activates a frontoparietal "mirror" network in the right hemisphere: an event-related fMRI study (2005, unknown): “We may be seeing mirror areas more active for self-recognition because their role is to establish communication between individuals via a simulation mechanism that maps actions of others onto one’s own motor repertoire (make others blike meQ (Meltzoff and Brooks, 2001)).”
- On seeing human: a three-factor theory of anthropomorphism. (2007, background): “Understanding others as distinct entities requires first developing a more sophisticated self-concept, and then using this knowledge to simulate another agent' experiences and therefore infer another person's mental states (e.g., Heal, 1986; Meltzoff & Brooks, 2001; Piaget, 1929).”
- Phenomenology and Psychopathology (2010, background): “By noticing how others interact with the world, they learn the usage and meaning that objects have for them, and they recognize others’ goals and intentions in uncompleted actions (Baldwin and Baird 2001; Meltzoff and Brooks 2001).”
- Psychological and Sociomoral Reasoning in Infancy (2014, background): “By their first birthday, infants attribute to an agent a preference for object- 2004; Spaepen & Spelke, 2007), as we saw before, but also when she repeatedly points to objectA or looks at it intently (e.g., Meltzoff & Brooks, 2001; Woodward, 2003; Woodward & Guajardo, 2002).”
- Being Together in Time: Musical Experience and the Mirror Neuron System (2009, background): “Such a neural system allows one, in essence, to experience the mind of the other, making others “like me” (Meltzoff & Brooks, 2001).”
- Mirror Neurons, Embodied Simulation, and the Neural Basis of Social Identification (2009, unknown): “…actively solicit their caregivers’ “protoconversational” turn-taking structure, that is, characterized by a structure remarkably similar to adult conversations (see Braten, 1988, 1992, 2007; Meltzoff & Brooks, 2001; Meltzoff & Moore, 1977, 1998; Stern, 1985; Trevarthen, 1979, 1993; Tronick, 1989).”
- The Phenomenological Mind (2007, unknown): “Thus, the child, on seeing an adult who tries to manipulate a toy and who appears frustrated about being unable to do so, quite readily picks up the toy and shows the adult how to do it (Meltzoff 1995; Meltzoff and Brooks 2001).”
- Mirroring others' emotions relates to empathy and interpersonal competence in children (2008, background): “The capacity to code the ‘like me’ analogy between self and others may represent a basic prerequisite for the development of social cognition (Meltzoff, 2005; Meltzoff and Brooks, 2001; Meltzoff and Moore, 1977), allowing for meaningful social bonds to be established between individuals.”