Quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes

By Xiangkang Yin, Yew-Kwang Ng. 2000

585 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/564e5f1719751a052d2586a0bfd34a425721006d

Citations in the corpus

• Generation Capacity Expansion in Imperfectly Competitive Restructured Electricity Markets (2005, unknown): “Yet, their economics have remained essentially the same as in Massé and Gibrat (1957). Generation plants differ by their investment and operation costs.”
• Strategic Investment and Pricing Decisions in a Congested Transport Corridor (2007, unknown): “In the industrial organisation literature an shaped congestion function is used by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to show that a 2 stage capacity and price game gives the same results as a one stage Cournot game in quantities.”
• Bilateral control with vertical contracts (2004, unknown): “Consider for example a framework à la Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) in which retailers first order quantities and then compete in prices: (i) M makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to each retailer.”
• Smart grids: Another step towards competition, energy security and climate change objectives (2011, unknown): “Under these circumstances, players apply prices higher than their marginal costs with the prospect of profits (Spulber, 1995; Lofaro, 2002; Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983; Tirole, 1993, p. 20).”
• EU emissions trading and the cement sector: a spatial competition analysis (2008, unknown): “The literature on imperfect competition under capacity constraints was initiated by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), who showed that quantity pre-commitment followed by Bertrand competition would result in an outcome equivalent to that of Cournot competition.”
• Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion? Second Version (2005, unknown): “Denoting by s21 the fraction of the market served by the upstream firm under collusion, the integrated firm will continue to collude as long as: s11π M (1− δ) ≥ π M +R + δ (1− δ) (6)”
• Competitive effects of vertical integration (2005, unknown): “This conduct might be rationalized, however, by assuming that firms first at each stage simultaneously choose quantities a la Cournot and then simultaneously choose prices a la Bertrand (Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983), although it is unclear to what extent this interpretation depends on assumptions abo”
• Bank Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited: New Theory and New Evidence (2007, unknown): “As shown by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), the outcome of this competition is equivalent to a two-stage game, where in the first stage banks commit to invest in observable “capacity” (deposit service facilities, such as branches, ATM, etc.), and in the second stage they compete in prices.”
• Market Structure and Environmental Innovation (2002, unknown): “Under tax regulation, this new situation leads to higher output qi (see (9)), same abatement qi ¡ ei (see eq.”
• Leaning Against the Wind (2007, unknown): “Hence, she would have incentive to maintain a small level of capital so as to make strictly positive profit, meaning that the aggregate marketmaking capital would turn out to be smaller than optimal (an intuition analogous to Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)).”
• An equilibrium analysis of efficiency gains from mergers (2012, unknown): “21The Cournot model can be interpreted as a reduced form of a two-stage game where rms rst choose capacities and subsequently compete in prices (Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983).”
• Should countries control international profit shifting (2006, unknown): “Our approach follows closely that of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to compute the mixed strategy equilibrium of the capacity constrained Bertrand competitors.11 With this type of equilibrium concept, strategies are lotteries in tax levels: regions play probability distributions Fi(ti) on the support…”