Bilateral control with vertical contracts

By Patrick Rey, T. Vergé. 2004

282 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0dc7f5958a9f54523f897ed0d73754e021520964

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

In Management Science and Operations Research

In Marketing

Citations in the corpus

Vertical integration, exclusive dealing, and ex post cartelization (2007, background): “24Alternatively, the upstream monopolist could solve the commitment problem by contracting with down- market, Rey and Vergé (2004) demonstrate a similar problem of opportunism in a model of downstream price-setting, creating a similar role for vertical integration to restore monopoly power.”
Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion? Second Version (2005, unknown): “, Kwoka and White (1999, part 3), Riordan and Salop (1995), Klass and Salinger (1995)).”
Upstream horizontal mergers, vertical contracts, and bargaining (2007, background): “The monopolist’s ‘commitment problem’ that has been identified also by McAfee and Schwartz (1995) and Rey and Vergé (2004) corresponds to the inability of U to commit to Di that it will not offer a lower wholesale price to Dj .12 Di knows that U has incentives to behave opportunistically and make…”
Information and Two-Sided Platform Profits (2014, background): “This is also quite realistic given the videogame console example we have in mind: the console may offer first-party games, web browsing and streaming movie services to users, but writing games for a console with no users is arguably worthless for developers.”
“Nash-in-Nash” Bargaining: A Microfoundation for Applied Work (2014, methodology): “…vertical contracting in industrial organization settings (e.g., Hart and Tirole 1990; O’Brien and Shaffer 1992; McAfee and Schwartz 1994; Segal 1999; Rey and Vergé 2004; cf. Whinston 7 Since downstream firms pay upstream firms, payments are the prices for downstream firms and the negative of the…”
Competitive effects of vertical integration (2005, background): “In the price-setting case, however, even under an alternative belief system (“wary beliefs”), incentives for opportunistic behavior by U result in a more competitive outcome compared to a vertically and horizontally integrated monopoly (Rey and Verge, 2003).”
Price vs. Quantity Competition in a Vertically Related Market (2014, background): “7See McAfee and Schwartz (1995), Rey and Vergè (2004), and Milliou and Petrakis (2007) for details regarding the possible non-existence of a pure strategy pairwise proof equilibrium.”