Auction design for voluntary conservation programs

By Timothy N. Cason, Lata Gangadharan. 2004

150 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/56495797c51e7659edbc356826bda32ab4b49d23

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

In Management Science and Operations Research

In Safety Research

Citations in the corpus

Paying for the hydrological services of Mexico's forests: Analysis, negotiations and results (2008, background): “Among the different types of auctions, Cason and Gangadharan (2004) show that a discriminatory pricing auction would yield more environmental benefits by capturing the producer surplus for the government.”
Public Benefits, Private Benefits, and Policy Mechanism Choice for Land-Use Change for Environmental Benefits (2008, unknown): “A further option is to run a conservation auction, in which landholders reveal their willingness to act in response to a subsidy level chosen by them (e.g., Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort 1997; Stoneham et al. 2003; Cason and Gangadharan 2004; Kirwin, Lubowski, and Roberts 2005).”
How should we incentivize private landowners to ‘produce’ more biodiversity? (2012, background): “Schillizzi and Latacz-Lohmann (2007) Cason et al. (2003), Cason and Gangadharan (2004) and Rolfe et al. (2009) indicate that inter-temporal learning in general reduces the cost efficiency of the auctions relative to a subsidy irrespective of the ecological goal, or that there is only a very modest…”
The efficiency of voluntary incentive policies for preventing biodiversity loss (2009, background): “Among voluntary approaches, evidence from experiments fi ds that conservation auctions tend to be more efficient than fixed price contracts when rgulators do not lack full information about landowner payoffs (Cason and Gangadharan 2004, Schillizzi and Latacz-Lohmann 2007).”
Cost-effective design of agri-environmental payment programs: U.S. experience in theory and practice (2008, background): “…about the acceptable level of bids has been reduced bymultiple, sequential sign-ups fromwhich producers have derived information on likely weight for the cost factor and the overall EBI cut-off score (see Cason and Gangadharan, 2004, for discussion of issues relating to sequential sign-ups).”