Does economics make citizens corrupt
By Björn Frank, G. Schulze. 2000
414 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Demography, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/554c8c6d8bc29102318dd68e95a6687b4e3cf0e7
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Demography
- Rachel T. A. Croson
- Ananish Chaudhuri
- Stephan Meier
- Bruno S. Frey
- Leonardo Bursztyn
- S. Solnick
- Lata Gangadharan
- J. Murnighan
In Safety Research
- Ananish Chaudhuri
- Rachel T. A. Croson
- Stephan Meier
- Bruno S. Frey
- Lata Gangadharan
- Deepak Malhotra
- J. Murnighan
- Leonardo Bursztyn
In Sociology and Political Science
- Stephan Meier
- Bruno S. Frey
- Deepak Malhotra
- Ananish Chaudhuri
- Lata Gangadharan
- J. Murnighan
- Olivier Armantier
- L. Tost
Citations in the corpus
- Trust and gender: An examination of behavior and beliefs in the Investment Game (2008, background): “Additionally, in an experimental study in which participants could elect to receive a bribe, no significant gender differences were found (Frank and Schulze, 2000).”
- Propensities to engage in and punish corrupt behavior: Experimental evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore (2009, methodology): “Frank and Schulze (2000) focus on the individual determinants of corruptibility and find that economics students are significantly more corrupt than others.”
- Misperceptions About Others (2021, background): “14 For example, Grigorieff et al. (2020) elicit beliefs about the share of undocumented immigrants immediately after the information treatment and find a persuasion rate of 23%, whereas Kendall et al.”
- (Why) are Economists Different? (2005, neutral): “FRANK and G.G. SCHULZE (2000). They investigated whether economics makes citizens corrupt.”
- The Legacy Motive: A Catalyst for Sustainable Decision Making in Organizations (2010, background): “…own outcomes and maximizing benefi ts to the group, have found evidence of a norm of self-interest in economics and business students (Cadsby and Maynes, 1998; Marwell & Ames, 1981), professors (Frank & Schulze, 2000), experienced accountants (Ponemon, 1992), and managers (Elm & Nichols, 1993).”
- Economics Education and Greed (2011, background): “…make people more self-interested and less cooperative (Marwell & Ames, 1981; Frank, et al, 1993), this research has been repeatedly challenged (Yezer, et al, 1996; Laband & Beil, 1999; Frank & Schulze, 2000), particularly because of the possibility of self-selection effects (Frank & Schulze, 2000).”
- Are political economists selfish and indoctrinated? Evidence from a natural experiment (2003, background): “…of economics education on cooperation are Marwell and Ames (1981), Frey et al. (1993), Bohnet and Frey (1995), Seguino et al. (1996), Cadsby and Maynes (1998), Stanley and Tran (1998), and Frank and Schulze (2000). fund supporting foreigners who study at the University of Zurich (Foreigner Fund).”
- Why are Economists so Different? Nature, Nurture and Gender Effects in a Simple Trust Game (2014, neutral): “, 2011), but also report that economists are more selfish and less trustworthy than others (see, e.g., Carter and Irons, 1991; Frank et al., 1993, 1996; Frank and Schulze, 2000; Lundquist et al., 2009).”
- Pro-Social Behavior, Reciprocity or Both? (2002, neutral): “Prior research has looked at the differences between economists and non-economists in their cooperative behavior (e.g. Marwell and Ames 1981, Carter and Iron 1991, Frey et al. 1993 and Frank and Schulze 2000).”