Securing the AES Finalists Against Power Analysis Attacks

By Thomas S. Messerges. Fast Software Encryption Workshop, 2000

350 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, Hardware and Architecture

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/50a7c22bfdc116cad796e090ca918549d81a7011

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Citations in the corpus

Provably Secure Higher-Order Masking of AES (2010, methodology): “When the SCA threat appeared, secret sharing was quickly identified as a pertinent protection strategy [6, 17] and numerous schemes (often called masking schemes) were published that were based on this principle (see for instance [1,3,18,23,26,29,34,38]).”
Statistical Analysis of Second Order Differential Power Analysis (2009, methodology): “Therefore, first order masking (together with hardware countermeasures) is widely used to protect block ciphers implementations against DPA [6], [9], [10].”
Private Circuits: Securing Hardware against Probing Attacks (2003, methodology): “For instance, Daemen and Rijmen proposed replacing each wire of a circuit by two wires, one carrying the original bit and the other its complement [15]; Messerges proposed “data masking”, where each value is split into two shares using a 2-out-of-2 secret sharing scheme [27]; Goubin and Patarin sugg”
Using Second-Order Power Analysis to Attack DPA Resistant Software (2000, methodology): “Similar techniques were also proposed to protect the advanced encryption standard algorithms from power attacks [9].”
Multiplicative Masking and Power Analysis of AES (2002, background): “Of course, one has to be careful to mask the data completely and thus avoid weaknesses such as the one shown in [6] for a masking technique from [11].”
Template Attacks (2002, background): “Since Paul Kocher’s original paper [12], a number of devastating attacks, such as Simple Power Analysis (SPA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA) have been reported on a wide variety of cryptographic implementations [15,18, 6,11,17,8,3,4,10,16,7,5,21].”
Mutual Information Analysis (2008, background): “Both theory and practice have been developed and as a consequence several more advanced power analysis attacks such as correlation [2], template [3], and higher-order attacks [11] have been proposed as well as a broad range of countermeasures [4,6,7,10].”
Secure Hardware Implementation of Nonlinear Functions in the Presence of Glitches (2011, background): “Masking is a side-channel countermeasure which tries to randomize the intermediate values of a cryptographic algorithm [22].”
Report on the Development of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (2001, methodology): “[65] can be considered a generalization of software balancing.”
Masking against Side-Channel Attacks: A Formal Security Proof (2013, background): “Further schemes were subsequently published in which masking is applied at hardware or software level at the cost of different area-time-memory trade-offs (see for instance [2,28,30]).”
Fault Based Cryptanalysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (2003, background): “Likewise, the security of AES against side-channel attacks like timing analysis and power analysis, has also been examined, cf. [AG,BS99,CJRR,DR1,KQ,KWMK, Me ,YT].”