Provably Secure Higher-Order Masking of AES
By Matthieu Rivain, Emmanuel Prouff. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2010
565 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/50960593fbebf07ffdf6e9222cc964f6d08b9f43
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Marcel Keller
- Nigel P. Smart
- Ivan Bjerre Damgård
- Emmanuel Prouff
- Pierre-Yves Strub
- Gilles Barthe
- Benjamin Gr'egoire
- Enrique Larraia
In Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
- Emmanuel Prouff
- Ivan Bjerre Damgård
- Nigel P. Smart
- Matthieu Rivain
- Marcel Keller
- Gilles Barthe
- Stefan Mangard
- Benjamin Gr'egoire
Citations in the corpus
- Implementing AES via an Actively/Covertly Secure Dishonest-Majority MPC Protocol (2012, methodology): “We could reduce this down to four multiplications by applying the Frobenius map to other elements [27]; but this will consume even more random bits per S-Box thus we settled for the above implementation which consumes 16 sharings of random bits per S-Box invocation.”
- Strong Non-Interference and Type-Directed Higher-Order Masking (2016, methodology): “We now illustrate the type system by describing a typing derivation on Rivain and Prouff’s algorithm for computing inversion in GF(2(8)) [32, 16].”
- Domain-Oriented Masking: Compact Masked Hardware Implementations with Arbitrary Protection Order (2016, background): “[25] that there indeed exists a relation between the number of probed wires in the d-probing model and the attack order for a differential power analysis (DPA) attack.”
- Breaking Cryptographic Implementations Using Deep Learning Techniques (2016, background): “In the literature, several provably secure higher-order masking schemes have been proposed (see for instance [13], [19] and [44].”
- Masking against Side-Channel Attacks: A Formal Security Proof (2013, background): “Then higherorder masking schemes were defined to get security against side-channel attacks exploiting the leakage of several, say d, intermediate computations [3, 16, 33, 34].”