Sequential decision and strategy vector methods in ultimatum bargaining: evidence on the strength of other-regarding behavior

By Robert J. Oxoby, Kendra N. McLeish. 2004

161 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: General Decision Sciences, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c0b2c2f7d7fbfa6809105a6cddf6cb364d517233

Citations in the corpus

• The strategy versus the direct-response method: a first survey of experimental comparisons (2011, unknown): “In Oxoby and McLeish (2004), small offers in a dictator game are”
• More than Thirty Years of Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments: Motives, Variations, and a Survey of the Recent Literature (2013, unknown): “Much of the discussion concerning “hot play” versus “cold play” – methodologically speaking, the difference between the direct response method and the strategy (vector) method in economic experiments (see also Brandts and Charness, 2011) – relied on evidence from the ultimatum game (Brosig et al., 2”
• Social Interactions and the Salience of Social Identity (2011, unknown): “…similar to the strategy vector method (i.e. participants decide on the choices they would make in either role before the roles are assigned; see Oxoby and McLeish, 2004).4 Participants were informed that they would be randomly and anonymously matched over the computer network with another…”