Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey. (Part 1: A Review of the Literature on Corporate Governance)

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Corporate Governance and Liquidity (2010, unknown): “Equity compensation and ownership programs are typically adopted with the intention of aligning the financial incentives of directors and executives with those of shareholders, as suggested by the literature on optimal contracting (Core, Guay, and Larcker (2003)).”
Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer (2016, unknown): “Core, Guay, and Larcker (2003) and Frydman and Jenter (2010) focus largely on the empirical evidence.”
The Role of Information and Financial Reporting in Corporate Governance and Debt Contracting (2010, result): “This definition is broadly consistent with the views of authors such as Jensen (1993); Mehran (1995); Shleifer and Vishny (1997); Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999); Holderness (2003); and Core, Guay, and Larcker (2003).”
Role of Managerial Incentives and Discretion in Hedge Fund Performance (2009, background): “See Murphy (1999) and Core, Guay, and Larcker (2003) for a however, there is no clear link between incentives and performance.”
Earnings Restatements, Changes in CEO Compensation, and Firm Performance (2008, methodology): “To help explain this, we appeal to arguments in Core and Guay (1999) and Core, Guay, and Larcker (2003).”
The Role of Accounting in the Design of CEO Equity Compensation (2007, background): “This mixed evidence has led to a call for research on the effect that accounting standards have on the use of stock options (Core et al., 2003).”