Investment and liquidation in renegotiation-proof contracts with moral hazard

By Vincenzo Quadrini. 2004

148 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4b53041bfcd3ce188680ff10a16630ba4512dd5b

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Citations in the corpus

Financial Contracting: A Survey of Empirical Research and Future Directions (2009, background): “These studies include Quadrini (2004), Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), and DeMarzo and Fishman (2007b).”
Dynamic Agency and the q Theory of Investment (2012, methodology): “Our analysis is also directly related to other analyses of agency, dynamic contracting and investment, e.g., Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004), Quadrini (2004) and Clementi and Hopenhayn (2005).”
Stock-Based Compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives (2008, background): “The intertemporal utilities under these two strategies in the conceal equilibrium are identical, but with the asymmetric information price Pai,t substituted in place of P before fi,t in both (33) and (34).”
Ramsey Monetary Policy With Labour Market Frictions (2009, unknown): “The findings in this paper are consistent with those in Cooley and Quadrini (2004).”
The Role of Dynamic Renegotiation and Asymmetric Information in Financial Contracting (2015, unknown): “…and Hopenhayn (2004), Lorenzoni and Walentin (2007), and Rampini and Viswanathan (2010, 2013) derive optimal long-term contracts that are free from renegotiation (Quadrini, 2004) because the lack of contract enforceability necessitates a long-term contract that remains on the pareto frontier.”
The Role of Debt and Equity Finance Over the Business Cycle (2012, background): “Quadrini (2004) also considers an environment in which the scrap value of the firm may exceed the joint value of the contract.”
Optimal Long-Term Financial Contracting (2007, background): “Quadrini (2004); Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), and DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) also examine multiperiod versions of this model and allow for the determination of the contract in which the firm uses cash reserves in place of the credit line and they derive additional asset pricing implications.”
Large risks, limited liability, and dynamic moral hazard (2010, methodology): “that is ∞ = 0. This allows us to pin down the constant c in (40), and provides key insights into the properties of the solution to ( 41 ) in the no investment region (b;wi].”
Optimal Monetary Policy Rules with Labor Market Frictions (2008, background): “Let’s define mct, the lagrange multiplier on constraint (11), as the marginal cost of firms and μt, the lagrange multiplier on constraint (12), as the marginal value of one worker.”