Dynamic Agency and the q Theory of Investment

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Large risks, limited liability, and dynamic moral hazard (2010, methodology): “For any such contract, the dynamics of the agent’s continuation utility W is given by (13), for a process H that satisfies the incentive compatibility condition (14).”
Collateral, Risk Management, and the Distribution of Debt Capacity (2010, background): “…firm financing; see Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), Gromb (1994), and, more recently, Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), DeMarzo and Fishman (2007a, 2007b), Biais et al. (2007), DeMarzo et al. (2007), and Atkeson and Cole (2008) in addition to the papers mentioned above.”
Why Does the Law Matter? Investor Protection and Its Effects on Investment, Finance, and Growth (2012, positive): “1 Our two hypotheses are consistent with the theoretical model in DeMarzo et al. (2010), which predicts that agency problems cause investment to be less sensitive to q, and more sensitive to past profits.”
Dynamic Investment, Capital Structure, and Debt Overhang (2015, neutral): “Dixit and Pindyck (1994) is a standard reference on real-options approach toward investment.”
Does the Market for CEO Talent Explain Controversial CEO Pay Practices (2014, methodology): “14 DeMarzo et al. (2012) show in a dynamic agency problem that luck could optimally enter compensation contracts.”