Why Did Some Banks Perform Better During the Credit Crisis? A Cross-Country Study of the Impact of Governance and Regulation

By Andrea Beltratti, René M. Stulz. 2009

373 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4b34ed90b0406c863ee7ca2f919436e853094aa1

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Citations in the corpus

Do Corporate Boards Affect Firm Performance? New Evidence from the Financial Crisis (2012, positive): “13 Baek et al. (2004) and Beltratti and Stulz (2009) also use accounting profitability as the performance measure in their studies.”
Corporate governance in the 2007–2008 financial crisis: Evidence from financial institutions worldwide (2012, neutral): “For example, Beltratti and Stulz (2009) use a sample of 98 banks from 20 countries, but examine only how governance indices and bank regulation relate to bank performance during the crisis.”
Bank Capital and Financial Stability: An Economic Trade-Off or a Faustian Bargain? (2014, background): “Beltratti & Stulz (2009) investigate whether precrisis bank attributes explain performance during the crisis.”
Corporate Governance and Performance in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: Evidence from US Commercial Banks (2011, background): “…and examine its impact on financial performance and loan quality in the following three years (2006 to 2008) for both annual and three-year average performance, given that the effect of corporate governance on performance may not materialize in one year (Beltratti & Stulz, 2009; Sun & Cahan, 2009).”
Does “Good” Corporate Governance Help in a Crisis? The Impact of Country‐ and Firm‐Level Governance Mechanisms in the European Financial Crisis (2013, methodology): “Moreover, our finding that firms located in market based systems enjoy a comparative advantage in steady-state conditions but lose that advantage in crisis is consistent with Beltratti and Stulz’s (2009) findings that some shareholder-friendly corporate governance mechanisms are”
The Bank Lending Channel: Lessons from the Crisis (2011, positive): “In the same way, Beltratti and Stulz (2009) showed that stock market prices of banks with more Tier 1 capital have also done relatively better during the crisis than banks with low levels of capitalisation.”
Global Crises and Equity Market Contagion (2012, neutral): “In a related vein, Stulz and Beltratti (2009) investigate whether the variation in the cross-section of stock returns of large banks across the world during the crisis is related to bank-level governance, country-level governance, country-level regulation, as well as to bank balance sheet and…”