Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science.

By Shaun Gallagher. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2000

2,629 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Social Psychology, Philosophy

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4b211c8b27e5f5fb6df028a1a66f75ba21d09896

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Citations in the corpus

From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind (2016, background): “The ‘body’ in question is squarely inside the head—absent are the dense causal, dynamical couplings between internal and external phenomenon that characterize enactive views of embodied cognition (Chemero 2011; Gallagher 2000; Varela et al. 1991).”
Toward a Phenomenology of Mindfulness: Subjective Experience and Emotional Correlates (2009, background): “This opens the question of who is doing the looking or, said differently, who is the self simply attending to what is? A number of philosophical traditions propose that there are two selves that correspond to the modes of processing outlined here (e.g., Gallagher, 2000 ).”
Neural signatures of body ownership: a sensory network for bodily self-consciousness. (2007, background): “The feeling that ‘‘my body’’ belongs to me, and is ever present in my mental life, is called body ownership ( Gallagher 2000 ).”
Self-referential reflective activity and its relationship with rest: a PET study (2005, background): “…as the center of an egocentric experiential space (Vogeley and Fink, 2003), and these representations may be crucial to having a bminimal selfQ (Gallagher, 2000), bcore selfQ (Damasio, 1999), or bobserving selfQ (Baars et al., 2003) defined as bconsciousness of oneself as an immediate subject…”
Drumming in Immersive Virtual Reality: The Body Shapes the Way We Play (2013, background): “Body ownership refers to the feeling that the body and bodily sensations are self-attributed [7-9], e.”
Possible links between self-awareness and inner speech: Theoretical background, underlying mechanisms, and empirical evidence (2004, background): “Quite a few closely related notions and variations of self-awareness can be found in the literature: private and public self-consciousness, metaconsciousness, meta-cognition, higher-order thought, autonoetic or extended consciousness, second-order consciousness, reflective awareness, access consciou”
Neurophenomenology Integrating Subjective Experience and Brain Dynamics in the Neuroscience of Consciousness (2003, background): “…this second issue concerns the noetic side of consciousness, in particular the noetic aspect of 'ipseity' or the minimal subjective sense of 'I-ness' in experience, which is constitutive of a 'minimal' or 'core self', as contrasted with a 'narrative' or 'autobiographical self' (Gallagher, 2000).”
Self-referential processing in our brain - A meta-analysis of imaging studies on the self (2006, background): “…''experiential self'' (Lambie and Marcel, 2002; Zahavi, 2003), ''prereflective self'' (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2005; Legrand, 2005), or ''minimal self'' (Gallagher, 2000; Gallagher and Frith, 2003) (see also (Lambie and Marcel, 2002; Baars et al., 2003; Dalgleish, 2004; Marcel and Lambie, 2004).”
IDEOMOTOR ACTION CONTROL: ON THE PERCEPTUAL GROUNDING OF VOLUNTARY ACTIONS AND AGENTS (2011, background): “‖ This perceptual take on the concept of the self—the minimal self in the terminology of Gallagher (2000)—suggests that people, including oneself, are cognitively represented just like any other event: in terms of the perceptual effects they create.”
The sense of self in the phenomenology of agency and perception (2007, background): “It is that aspect of the self that remains when one abstracts away from the experience of temporally extended, ‘narrative’ personal identity, which is partially sustained by memory of past events (Gallagher 2000).”
How Would You Feel versus How Do You Think She Would Feel? A Neuroimaging Study of Perspective-Taking with Social Emotions (2004, background): “, 1997) has pointed out the importance of right inferior parietal lobe functional integrity for correct agency judgment (i.e., the awareness of being the initiator or source of a movement, action, or thought; Gallagher, 2000).”
Beads for a Plastic Mind: the ‘Blind Man's Stick’ (BMS) Hypothesis and the Active Nature of Material Culture (2008, background): “…from that of a ‘minimal’, ‘prereflexive’, ‘bodily’ or ‘ecological’ protoself to that of a ‘narrative’, ‘reflexive’, ‘conceptual’ or ‘representational’ metaself (Gallagher 2000; Neisser 1988; Frith 2005; Legrand 2006; Lewis 2003; Rochat 2003) clearly points out that the development of human…”
A Survey of Presence and Related Concepts (2017, background): “Agency [104] is, “the sense that I am the one who is causing or generating an action” [51], or “the satisfying power to take meaningful action and see the results of our decisions and choices” [92].”
Reconstructing and deconstructing the self: cognitive mechanisms in meditation practice. (2015, background): “This aspect of selfhood has been referred to as the “minimal self” [85] and “minimal phenomenal self” [86] and has been hypothesized to be instantiated in cortical activity in regions related to interoception, such as the anterior insula [87–89], in the temporo-parietal junction [90], as well as in ”